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This thesis consists of three chapters studying topics related to the corporate innovation 
management. More specifically, the first two chapters discuss the outbound open 
innovation phenomenon and its relationship with the firm’s behavior in technology and 
labor markets, respectively. The last chapter links the firm’s litigiousness with its 
collaborative activities.  
The thesis starts with the first chapter (co-authored with Araksya Ayvazyan) studying 
the firm\s decision to adopt outbound openness in its IP strategy.  We propose two channels 
through which a firm can potentially capitalize on a decision of adopting an outbound open 
approach in its intellectual property (IP) strategy for no direct financial benefits in return. 
The first channel involves selling subsequent intellectual assets in markets for technology 
to meet the demand resulting from the increased engagement of third parties in the liberated 
knowledge. The second one refers to bringing the subsequent external knowledge in-house 
via buying intellectual assets or building upon it internally. We capture the variation in 
IBM’s IP strategy toward more openness, using the decision of IBM to pledge 500 of its 
patents to the public in 2005. The results from implementing a difference-in-differences 
approach between 1999 and 2010 provide support for the proposed mechanisms.  
The second chapter explores how a firm’s move towards outbound open innovation 
strategy via opening up the firm’s intellectual property (IP) affects inventor mobility from 
the firm. Interestingly, the answer is not straightforward because there are arguments to 
expect both an increase as well as a decrease in inventor mobility as a consequence of the 





substitutability between the codified knowledge and the inventors’ tacit knowledge, and 
how it is altered by outbound openness. Using IBM’s 2005 patent pledge, to capture the 
firm’s shift towards outbound openness, I empirically investigate its consequences on the 
likelihood of IBM’s inventors to leave the firm. The findings, on average, favors the 
proposition that outbound openness decreases the firm’s labor mobility.  
In the third chapter (co-authored with Eduardo Melero, David Wehrheim), we study 
the effect of the strength of the IP enforcement on firm’s collaborative activities. We argue 
that there are two potential contradicting forces driving the effect, namely, the expected 
return from learning during a collaborative project, and the expected cost of any unintended 
potential knowledge leakage during that project. Our results from a quasi-natural 
experiment, exploiting the reduction of the IP enforcement due to a recent landmark event 
in the U.S. patent system (the ruling in eBay v. MercExchange), show that weaker property 
rights, on average, lead to fewer collaborations and alliances. To get additional insights, we 
also investigate the effect on particular types of collaborations, as well as in settings where 






Chapter 1  
What’s There to Gain? Outbound Openness and 
markets for technology 
(co-authored with Araksya Ayvazyan) 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past years, the practice of outbound open innovation1 has become increasingly 
popular among big players in the software, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and 
automobile industries (West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2014). Prominent 
examples are Johnson & Johnson’s innovation lab in La Jolla, California, IBM’s industry 
solution lab in Zurich Rüschlikon, or patent pledges of Red Hat (2002, 2017), IBM (2005), 
Google (2013), and many others. According to Linux Magazine, the 500 patents pledged by 
IBM “cost $10,000,000 to obtain (just in the U.S.) and are worth an unknown amount in 
licensing revenue”2. Interestingly, many such voluntary commitments to openness require 
no formal agreements to use the unlocked knowledge, meaning that outsiders can freely 
access it, without giving anything in return.  
Firms’ tendency toward making their knowledge or part of it available for free to 
outsiders (i.e. outbound open innovation3) in traditionally intellectual property (IP) 
                                                      
1 There are three main types of open innovation: outbound (inside-out knowledge flows), inbound (outside-in 
knowledge flows), and combined (both inside-out and outside-in knowledge flows) (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Chesbrough 2006a, 2006b). In this paper, we interchangeably use the terms outbound open innovation, 
outbound openness, and strategic openness to refer to the inside-out type of open innovation. 
2 http://www.linux-mag.com/id/1975/ 
3 In this study, by outbound open innovation we refer to the non-pecuniary type of outbound open innovation, 
following the definition by Dahlander & Gann (2010, p. 704), “This [non-pecuniary outbound] type of 
openness refers to how internal resources are revealed to the external environment. In particular, this approach 
deals with how firms reveal internal resources without immediate financial rewards…” The second, pecuniary 
type of outbound open innovation, distinguished by the authors, refers to dealing with external 





intensive industries represents a “departure in strategy to say the least” (Fortune, 2016)4. 
Indeed, the conventional premise from the resource-based view strongly associates resource 
ownership with the ability of a firm to appropriate value (e.g. Barney, 1991; Collis & 
Montgomery, 1998). Thus, by granting free access to proprietary assets, thereby allowing 
for imitability, firms may risk losing competitive advantage over rivals (Dahlander & Gann, 
2010). Then, why do corporate firms engage in outbound openness, especially without 
direct financial gains in exchange? In this paper, we suggest two main mechanisms that the 
firm may use to capitalize on its practice of outbound openness. These channels primarily 
concern strategic openness’ facilitating inward and outward knowledge flows, which in 
turn, induces the focal firm’s engagement in markets for technology, in terms of 
transactions for IP rights. This may give rise to potential externalities for the opening up 
firm. 
We complement to existing research that discusses possible incentives for firms to grant 
free access to their proprietary assets. These incentives comprise creating and obtaining 
returns from standards and their development (West, 2003; Henkel, 2006), advancing 
collective innovation (Levin et al., 1987), increasing the demand for their still proprietary 
assets that are complementary5 to the opened-up ones and saving costs (e.g. Raymond, 
1999; Alexy & Reitzig, 2013; Alexy, West, Klapper & Reitzig, 2018), or pursuing social 
goals (Raymond, 1999; Contreras, 2015). While these studies posit that other players in the 
market get more involved and contribute more to the opened-up intellectual assets (e.g. 
Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017), to the best of our knowledge, there is little research on 
whether and how the focal firms capitalize on and incorporate the newly created knowledge 
                                                      
4 http://fortune.com/2016/07/22/the-radical-experiment-thats-changing-the-way-big-pharma-innovates/ 
5 These are often “razor and blade” (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or “hardware and software” type of 





by others into their innovation processes. According to the literature on competitive 
dynamics, firms consider the possible reactions from other actors in the market, when 
making important strategic decisions. Therefore, arguably, following the practice of 
strategic openness, the way they manage their innovation processes will subsequently be 
altered due to the increased involvement and knowledge availability from third parties.  
An important element in our theoretical arguments is that outbound openness reduces 
transaction and negotiation costs, as well as litigation threats (Wen, Ceccagnoli, & Forman, 
2016). Due to the decrease in access costs and litigation risks, other firms get encouraged to 
become more involved (Boudreau, 2010) and subsequently build more knowledge. Further, 
the focal firm can respond to the advances in innovation in different ways: by selectively 
buying innovations that other firms have developed via relying on the liberated knowledge, 
or by making further internal developments through combining its expertise with the new 
knowledge created by others in a specific technology. At the same time, because strategic 
openness indirectly enforces the outsiders’ commitment to the liberated knowledge and 
technologies, as they create more complementary assets, thereby increasing their demand 
for the subsequent knowledge, the focal firm gets more opportunities for selectively selling 
its other internally developed knowledge. 
Our study makes use of IBM’s patent pledge of 2005 as a shock to the level of openness 
in the IP strategy of IBM (Wen et. al, 2016). Having the sample period from 1999 to 2010 
allows us to implement a difference-in-differences approach to explore the consequences of 
the openness decision on the firm’s engagement in markets for technology and the degree 
to and channels through which IBM utilizes the follow-on spillovers. Our results show that 
after 2005, IBM buys and sells more patents, proportionally to the level of openness in its 





activities by IBM. We also find that IBM continues to create further knowledge 
developments, building upon external sources of subsequent knowledge more than on its 
own subsequent knowledge.  
This study provides a new perspective on the firm’s decision to waive its exclusivity 
rights and uncovers an indirect mechanism that firms may exploit for potentially profiting 
from opening up, especially in the presence of a well-developed market for technology. 
Naturally, this advantage should be weighed against the potential negative effects in terms 
of competition that may be imposed by the loss of property rights. In this sense, opening up 
may be a particular suitable alternative when (in countries/technological areas) there are 
well-developed markets for technology allowing the firm to trade on the subsequently 
created knowledge. 
We contribute to the open innovation literature by providing a novel motivation and 
discussing potential indirect returns for the firms that adopt outbound openness pursuing no 
direct financial benefits. This link between open innovation and markets for technology has 
not been explored before, to the best of our knowledge. Put together, outbound open 
innovation could be viewed as complementary with trading in markets for technology. We 
also contribute to the literature on open innovation more broadly, by focusing on the effects 
of the outbound type of openness untangled from the inbound openness. While much of the 
prior research on open innovation has primarily focused on inbound open innovation, the 
outbound type of open innovation has received significantly less attention (Chesbrough, 
2003). Importantly, however, our knowledge on the effects of inbound open innovation 
does not substitute that of outbound open innovation, and many studies have called for 
investigations on outbound open innovation effects (e.g. West et al., 2014). In this paper, 





technology policy, but an important stepping stone for the subsequent development of 
innovation. 
1.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
1.2.1 Closed and Open Models of Innovation 
Unlike in the traditional “closed” approach of innovation, where firms largely focus on 
in-house research and development (R&D), whilst constraining outsiders from using their 
technology (Cohen et al., 2000), in “open” innovation models, firms tend to employ fewer 
boundaries on the use, development, and commercialization of the technology 
(Chesbrough, 2003). In this paper, we focus on a setting of purely outbound open 
innovation practices, where a firm explicitly grants the proprietary rights of its technology 
to the public domain (Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Boudreau, 2010). As patents or copyrights 
have long served as important mechanisms to protect firms from competitors by providing 
exclusive property rights for their innovations (Cohen et al., 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), 
without these rights, competitors, for instance, may be better placed in terms of their 
complementary assets or/and production facilities to utilize the opened-up knowledge by 
the focal firm (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Therefore, one of the main challenges for firms 
practicing outbound open innovation is the risk of not being able to appropriate benefits 
from their decision (Helfat, 2006). Nonetheless, firms are increasingly adopting openness in 
their innovation approaches, and therefore, we briefly discuss the prior literature on the 





1.2.2 Motives for Adopting Outbound Open Innovation 
We mentioned in the introduction some of the studies that extend the understanding of 
the underlying reasons why firms choose to open up their knowledge (e.g. von Hippel, 
1998, 2005; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; West, 2003; Henkel, 2006; Alexy & Reitzig, 
2013; Alexy et al., 2018). The theoretical premise from the previous literature is that 
opening up is not always detrimental for appropriating benefits from an innovation (von 
Hippel, 1998, 2005; Henkel, 2006; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). Several works link 
openness with appropriation benefits in return from resource complementarities. For 
instance, primarily addressing the question of who opens up their knowledge, Alexy & 
Reitzig (2013) suggest that by doing so, firms can enhance the demand for their 
complementary resources controlled by the firm. In the context of open source software 
(OSS), Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Luzzi (2008) find that the possession of complementary 
assets increases the likelihood of introducing OSS products. The authors argue that the 
control over complementary resources helps the firm to appropriate value from OSS 
development (Arora, 1995), and gives the firm a bargaining power to reduce potential 
litigation risks from other entities against OSS products (Ziedonis, 2004). Building on the 
resource-based view, Alexy et al. (2018) provide contexts when openness can help/harm 
firms, their competitors or both. In particular, the paper argues that when the cost of 
production is high for an innovation and it is strongly positioned with complementary 
assets, the firm may decide to open it up and utilize those complementary assets to 
internalize the benefits from the opened-up knowledge.  
Other explanations for engaging in openness include the following. A study by Henkel, 





can be explained by the consumer demand pull for openness and that such behavior brings 
in a positive feedback loop, eventually making openness become another dimension of 
competition. Alexy, George, & Salter (2013) propose that firms may also engage in 
strategic openness to increase collaborative activities with others in the market. The authors 
argue that firms will be more prone to openness, especially when there is a high partner 
uncertainty, high coordination costs, and when potential known partners are unwilling to 
collaborate. Other reasons for which firms may decide to grant access to their proprietary 
knowledge include endorsing product interoperability via standards creation or pursuing 
social goals (Contreras, 2015). 
Though a common assumption in these studies is that outbound openness induces third 
parties’ involvement in the opened-up technologies, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
still little research that has focused on whether and how the firms that decide to open up, 
can internalize the involvement from other entities in their further innovation processes. 
Focusing on the effect on outsiders, Wen et al. (2016) analyze how strategic openness 
affects new product introductions by start-up firms. The authors find that on average, more 
new product introductions occur by startups in areas of knowledge with higher rather than 
lower degrees of openness. Murray et al. (2016) find a positive impact of the level of 
openness associated with unlocked research tools on the subsequent innovations’ amount 
and type in a context of academic researchers. However, neither of these papers consider 
the consequences for the opening firm (IBM and Dupont, respectively) on its innovation 
strategy, which is key in this paper. 
One primary focus of this study is on how the level of openness in the IP strategy of a 





link the adoption of strategic openness to being on the supply and demand sides of markets 
for technology, following Arora & Gambardella (2010). 
1.2.3 Outbound Openness and Markets for Technology  
While developing new products and technologies is essential for survival and growth in 
today’s business environment (Swink, 2003), the possibility of purchasing technological 
assets can also provide firms with strategic flexibility to utilize on market opportunities 
(Cesaroni, 2004). Markets for technology, where inventors (organizations, individual 
inventors, etc.) trade knowledge assets, have grown substantially over the past decades 
(Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; Arora & Gambardella, 2010) 
and have received considerable attention from business and economics scholars, despite the 
general assumption of being underutilized. Prior literature provides mixed evidence on the 
relationship between markets for technology and IP protection (Arora & Gambardella, 
2010). Some studies find a positive association (e.g. Arora, 1995; Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002), while other works find that weak or ineffective patent regimes 
are likely to increase trades in technology markets, or else, that IP protection has no effect 
on these markets (e.g. Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999; Smith, 2001; Nagaoka, 2002; Fosfuri, 
2004). Our paper adds to this stream of research by investigating the link between outbound 
openness (i.e. explicitly giving up IP protection for some pieces of knowledge) and markets 
for technology. In the next section, we hypothesize on possible mechanisms through which 
the focal firm can capitalize on its practice of outbound openness, and Figure (1) depicts the 
hypotheses that we discuss in the following subsections. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 






1.2.4 Internalization Mechanisms of Outbound Openness: Selling in Markets for 
Technology 
Outbound openness and selling in markets for technology. As a firm waives the 
proprietary rights to its technology, other players in the market are per se exposed to more 
“usable” knowledge6. Exposure to external knowledge sources increases the likelihood that 
other firms will seek to make use of the external knowledge (Huber, 1991), especially if the 
contribution is significantly large. This can be explained by the fact that the voluntarily 
liberated knowledge translates into decreased transaction and negotiation costs and 
litigation threats (Boudreau, 2010; Wen et al., 2016) for others, which encourages them to 
incorporate the opened-up knowledge into their internal innovation processes. If before, 
third parties had to pay royalty fees or else, buy the proprietary rights to incorporate it 
without infringing, now these entities can freely access and make use of this knowledge.  
To be able to exploit the liberated knowledge, outside actors are likely to create other 
supporting assets. These supporting assets can take the form of complementary downstream 
resources, as such resources related to manufacturing, marketing, or distributing the 
products that use the opened-up knowledge. This, in turn, will tend to increase third parties’ 
valuations of future inventions and further advancements of the opened-up knowledge. 
Consequently, the demand for the subsequent innovations based on the specific pieces of 
knowledge will tend to increase. In other words, as outsiders incorporate the opened-up 
knowledge into their internal innovation processes, by investing in complementary assets to 
support the knowledge usage and commercialization, they will tend to have a higher 
                                                      
6 As patents are public, anyone can access the information provided in the patent. In this context, by “usable” 
knowledge, we mean that for the opened-up patent, the inventor is given the right to use the relevant 
knowledge without the need to pay any royalty fees. Additionally, the inventor is exempt from a litigation 






demand for related inventions. Hence, the focal firm practicing strategic openness, will 
obtain more opportunities for selling its other proprietary knowledge to outsiders7.  
Two main factors can help explain that the focal firm could indeed translate these 
increased selling opportunities into supplying the demanded pieces of knowledge following 
its practice of outbound openness. First, due to its prior experience with the opened-up 
knowledge, one could argue that the firm is naturally equipped with a stock of relevant 
knowledge, which would make it possible for the firm to satisfy the increased demand. 
Second, for the increased demand to be actually satisfied by the focal firm, the gains from 
selling opportunities would arguably need to exceed the costs from losing ownership and 
control over its other proprietary assets. As the probability of engaging in beneficial selling 
transactions would plausibly increase with higher demand and involvement from outside 
parties, in the hypothesis below, we expect the focal firm to sell more of its still-proprietary 
knowledge after the decision to open up. 
Hypothesis 1. The more openness the firm adopts in its IP strategy, the more 
knowledge it sells in the markets for technology.  
1.2.5 Internalization Mechanisms of Outbound Openness: Using the Subsequently 
Created Knowledge via Buying in Markets for Technology or Building upon it 
Outbound openness and buying in markets for technology. Another logical reaction 
from outside parties to the reduction in the costs and risks of incorporating the liberated 
                                                      
7 Though outside the scope of the current study, the increase in the demand for relevant inventions will not 
necessarily only benefit the focal firm. Since outbound openness can also induce other firms to create their 
own advancements of knowledge (see further development of the hypotheses; and for a more detailed 
discussion, see Ayvazyan & Matr, 2019), the increased demand for the subsequent knowledge can be satisfied 





knowledge is to engage in creating subsequent developments8, for instance, by building 
upon it or/and by recombining it with their pre-existing stocks of knowledge. In the context 
of platform development, Parker & Van Alstyne (2017) argue that platform openness 
stimulates third-party developers to build upon the made-free knowledge and generate 
R&D spillovers. As others having diverse capabilities innovate and contribute to these 
opened-up technologies, the possibilities of knowledge recombination and new knowledge 
creation increase. Galasso & Schankerman (2015) document an increase in the follow-on 
inventive activities in the aftermath of involuntary waivers of exclusivity rights, i.e. patent 
invalidation decisions from the court. Despite the decision of patent invalidation, follow-on 
innovators are still required to recognize prior art, though now, without the need for paying 
any royalty fees (i.e. reduced costs for using the knowledge). Similarly, in the context of 
voluntary waivers of exclusivity rights (i.e. outbound openness), third-party engagement in 
advancing the liberated knowledge will tend to increase. 
The increased involvement from outside parties in developing new knowledge will be 
reinforced by the increased demand for the subsequent knowledge from those engaging in 
creating complementary assets, as a response to strategic openness (as hypothesized 
previously). From the focal firm’s point of view, the advancements of the liberated 
knowledge by others will, in turn, represent opportunities for internalizing these spillovers 
through two main channels. First, the focal firm could selectively buy from the new 
knowledge. Second, it could incorporate the further developments by building upon them 
within the limits of non-infringement of property rights. 
                                                      
8 Building complementary assets and engaging in creating further knowledge are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Third parties may do both and this could depend on various factors (e.g. the degree of their 





These two mechanisms (at least partially) can be explained through the lens of the 
concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Having the privilege of 
familiarity and a likely considerable experience with the previously proprietary knowledge, 
the focal firm will possess important absorptive capacities for identifying and evaluating 
the follow-on inventions (Arora & Gambardella, 1994). These abilities will facilitate the 
firm’s engagement in buying transactions of the subsequent external pieces of knowledge, 
which can potentially be more value-enhancing in terms of their suitability with the firm’s 
innovative needs. In addition, being familiar and experienced in the liberated knowledge, 
focal firms would likely be equipped with the necessary complementary assets to be able to 
incorporate the outside knowledge into their internal innovation processes. These two 
factors, namely absorptive capacities and complementarities between internal and external 
knowledge are, in fact, two of the three main drivers of the demand side of markets for 
technology, as identified by Arora & Gambardella (2010). The third driver relates to the so-
called “Not-Invented-Here” (NIH) syndrome, which largely refers to the irrational bias 
against outside sources of knowledge/technology. This syndrome may, at the extreme case, 
lead to an exclusively internal recombination of knowledge, thereby potentially putting the 
firm into a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993). However, it 
is less likely to be dominant in firms that adopt open innovation approaches, since these 
firms are supposedly more “open-minded” towards outside-in or inside-out knowledge 
flows9. Thus, while absorptive capacities will tend to help the focal firm to identify and 
evaluate knowledge developments from third parties for buying decisions, the 
complementarities between internal knowledge and external knowledge advancements, 
                                                      
9 See Cassiman and Valentini (2016) for a discussion on the complementarities between outbound and 






together with a low propensity that the firm suffers from the NIH syndrome, will tend to 
mitigate the generally assumed underutilization of knowledge acquisitions in markets for 
technology.  
Taken together, the above-mentioned arguments support the premise that with strategic 
openness, the focal firm will get more opportunities for engaging in buying transactions in 
markets for technology. Hence, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2. The more openness the firm adopts in its IP strategy, the more 
knowledge it buys in the markets for technology. 
Outbound openness and building upon the knowledge spillovers. The second channel 
through which the firm may internalize the knowledge spillovers from the opened-up 
knowledge is via building upon these external knowledge advancements. This is especially 
relevant for situations, where directly incorporating others’ follow-on knowledge with the 
help of the firm’s complementary assets via buying in markets for technology (see the 
discussion above) is likely not an optimal choice for the firm. For instance, with the 
increased availability of subsequent knowledge due to outbound openness, it is possible 
that some of this externally developed knowledge is simply not yet commercializable and 
further technical developments are still required to ultimately take the knowledge to 
market. Considering that the focal firm can use its absorptive capacities of identifying and 
evaluating external pieces of knowledge from the pool of sequential inventions (due to its 





knowledge, the firm will be provided with new possibilities for further recombining and 
advancing the technology without infringing on others’10.  
Prior research has argued that building upon the subsequent technical developments for 
generating new knowledge is, in fact, beneficial for the focal inventing firm, as it may 
allow for capitalizing on the firm’s previous inventive efforts (Belenzon, 2012). The 
intuition behind is that by “reabsorbing” the subsequent knowledge, the firm may mitigate 
the potential negative effects of (involuntary) knowledge spillovers11 and sustain its long-
run earnings. Then one could argue that building on the follow-on knowledge would be 
especially important, when practicing outbound openness, where the firm itself allows for 
knowledge spillovers. This is the case, since with more involvement from others in creating 
developments of the opened-up knowledge, the competitive environment becomes more 
dynamic, increasing the need for the focal firm for developing and renewing prevailing 
capabilities to match the changing requirements of the environment (Teece et al., 1997). 
The increased “competition” anticipated by the firm’s adoption of outbound openness 
implies that the firm should protect its market position and continuously develop new 
knowledge to be able to compete in these fields. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2, we argue 
that the increased subsequent inventive output due to outbound openness would lead to 
more opportunities for the firm for internalizing those externalities. Hence, our third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. The more openness the firm adopts in its IP strategy, the more 
knowledge it builds upon the subsequently created knowledge.  
                                                      
10 Importantly, the newly created knowledge by the focal firm should be sufficiently differentiated from and 
not infringing on others’ inventions. Otherwise, the risks and costs of infringement could cancel out the 
potential benefits from building upon the external follow-on developments of the liberated knowledge. 






1.3 RESEARCH SETTING 
Studies on knowledge transfer among firms and on innovation have relied on the 
outcomes of technology licensing transactions (e.g. Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 
2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, & Luzzi, 2007) or collaborations (e.g. 
Singh, 2005; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Jugend et al., 2018). We argue that these proxies do 
not allow disentangling the effect of outbound open innovation for the following reasons. 
Firms engaging in licensing or collaborations remain in control, at least partially, of the 
flow of knowledge in terms of who can use the knowledge or how often they can use it. 
Specifically, in case of licensing, the firm chooses to whom to license, while getting 
royalties in return. On the one hand, this naturally limits the number of users, who can 
benefit from the knowledge, and on the other hand, the firm still holds the ownership of the 
knowledge. Similarly, in case of a collaboration, the firms remain the owners of the 
knowledge, and the knowledge flows in both directions, as the collaborating firms make 
their knowledge available to each other. As a result, the effect of outbound and inbound 
openness appears combined and separately undistinguishable.  
We deviate from these studies, by testing our hypotheses in a different setting, namely 
patent pledges. Specifically, our research context is IBM’s IP strategy and its consequences 
for innovation-related outcomes for IBM itself during the period from 1999 to 2010. In 
2005, IBM announced that it had decided to donate 500 of its patents to the public in 
support of the development of the OSS community. Being royalty-free, IBM’s patent 
pledge did not require any formal agreement for anybody to use the patents in the pledge. 
This means that anybody could use the opened-up knowledge without, for instance, a 





pledge a pure form of outbound openness. In addition, IBM made the decision of pledging 
these patents considering their substantial economic importance, as well as their ample 
coverage of technological classes. According to Linux Magazine, the 500 patents “cost 
$10,000,000 to obtain (just in the U.S.) and are worth an unknown amount in licensing 
revenue”12. IBM’s patent pledge announcement (2005) claimed that that patent pledge was 
by far the biggest contribution to the OSS, in terms of the number of patents. The 
announcement (2005) also stated that “Fostering Innovation, Interoperability and Open 
Standards” were the goal of the pledge. 
Nevertheless, several alternative motives behind IBM’s pledge have been discussed in 
various academic and non-academic sources. For instance, IBM pledge was suspected to be 
motivated by the dispute between IBM and Santa Cruz Operation (SCO) Group in 2003, 
where IBM was accused of infringing SCO’s UNIX code (Goettsch, 2003). After its 
counterclaim against SCO in 2004, IBM decided to offer the 500 patents in the pledge for 
free, arguably, to provide the OSS community with insurance about Linux, the open-source 
operating system IBM supported. Meanwhile, Alexy & Reitzig (2013) note that the patent 
pledge could have been reasoned to stimulate the demand for IBM’s complementary assets 
and the sales of its hardware products. Another speculation regarding this pledge refers to 
the debate about European software patent laws. Some observers doubted that IBM’s move 
was aimed at signaling to the European legislators that software patents did not necessarily 
hinder the innovation process. Altogether, we argue that these speculations do not seem to 
be directly related to IBM’s strategy in markets for technology. Thus, IBM pledge appears 
to be a suitable context to address our research question. 






1.3.1 Identification Strategy 
Empirically, we perform difference-in-differences analyses incorporating IBM’s pledge 
of 2005 at two different levels. The first set of analyses includes the level of knowledge 
domain, represented by technological classes, according to The United States Patent 
Classification (USPC). We use these class-level analyses (with class-year type of 
observations) to explain the temporal variation outcomes of patent trading (i.e. selling and 
buying) activities (for hypotheses 1 and 2), using a score of openness for each technological 
class. To understand the construction of this score (see “Independent Variables” 
subsection), we next explain our identification strategy at this level. First, we identify the 
treated group of technological classes, if the class includes any of the 500 patents that IBM 
pledged in 2005. There are 50 such technological classes. The classes without any pledged 
patent, to which IBM had significantly contributed up until 2005 – that is IBM patents 
counted for more than 2.5% of all the patents in the class or IBM had more than 200 patents 
in the class13 - serve as the control group of technological classes. There are 127 control 
classes, leaving us with 177 classes in total. Assigning an openness score to each of these 
technological classes allows us to explore whether IBM tends to buy or sell more patents in 
areas of knowledge in related to their levels of openness. 
In the second set of analyses, we use data at the patent-level (with patent-year 
observations). The goal of these analyses is to track the effect of the patent pledge on patent 
trading in a more detailed and direct manner and to test the impact on building upon the 
subsequently created external knowledge (Hypothesis 3), by examining the pledged patents 
and their spillovers, e.g. citing patents, in comparison to similar non-liberated patents and 
                                                      
13 The choice of the 200 patents allows us to avoid losing technological classes that have a substantial 





the latter’s spillovers. In these difference-in-differences analyses, we compare the pledged 
patents, i.e. treated group, to a selected group of similar patents, i.e. control group, which 
we construct by matching each pledged patent with other patents using a text matching 
algorithm to measure technological similarity, following Arts, Cassiman, & Gomez (2017). 
We ask for a minimum similarity score of 15% and require the control patents to have the 
same filing year and to belong to the same technological class. Eventually, we are left with 
1351 patents in the control group with an average of about three control patents for each 
patent in the pledge14. These treated and control patents represent the “Initial” patents 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
For each group (i.e. treated and control), we extend the number of patents by 
considering their spillovers, which we capture with “Level-one” and “Level-two” patents 
(see Figure 2). To do so, we draw on prior studies that argue for the proximity between 
citations and knowledge flows, despite possible noisiness15 (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 
2000; Duguet & Mac Garvie, 2005; Gay & Le Bas 2005), and use initial treated and control 
patents’ forward citations to proxy related knowledge flows (i.e. spillovers). Importantly, 
we differentiate between direct and indirect citations received by the initial patents. A 
patent that cites any of the initial patents (treated or control) represents a direct citation. We 
refer to this patent as level-one patent. Accordingly, depending on whether the level-one 
patent cites the pledged patent or a control patent, we consider it as treated or control, 
respectively. Further, a patent that cites the patent citing any of the initial patents (level-one 
                                                      
14 Note that there are duplications in the control patents for the treated patents (i.e. two different pledged 
patents can share the same control patent). 
15 The noisiness of this measure (using forward citations to capture knowledge flows) is mostly related to the 
fact that during the patent application process, citations from patent examiners, who are responsible for 
checking for prior art, may be added to the original references in the patent application. However, citations are 
still a valid empirical proxy, especially in industries, where knowledge creation is cumulative, and are widely 





patent) represents an indirect citation. We refer to this patent indirectly citing an initial 
patent as level-two patent (Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the discussion 
above)16. This distinction between level-one and level-two patents is especially relevant for 
testing our third hypothesis, where we look at whether an external patent (i.e. a patent that 
was not created by IBM) is more likely to be cited by IBM (level-two) if that patent 
(external level-one) has built upon any of IBM’s pledged patents after 2005. As for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, we test for whether being related to the pledge (level-one or level-two 
patents in the treated group), increases the likelihood of being traded by IBM. Not 
surprisingly, then, in the analyses related to Hypothesis 1 (selling) at the patent-level, we 
limit the sample to only IBM patents. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.3.2 Pledged Patents 
Before we turn to data description and results discussion, we further examine the 
differences between the pledged and control patents (at the initial level), to corroborate the 
suitability of our empirical exercise. In their study on the effect of IBM 2005 patent pledge 
on new product introductions, Wen et al. (2016) compare the patents in IBM’s pledge to a 
randomly selected group of similar patents in the market and conclude that the pledged 
patents have, in general, similar backward and forward citations, and that the pledged 
patents have lower number of claims. Similarly, they compare the pledged patents to other 
                                                      
16 Although intuitively, indirect citations are not limited to only level-two patents (they can include patents at 
level three and more), for methodological reasons associated with the data characteristics, we consider only 
up until the patents in the second level. However, we believe that this restriction should not distort our results, 
as the higher the so-called level of the citation, the farther and less related, in principle, the newly created 
knowledge from the original invention in the focal patent. And what we are interested in capturing, are the 





IBM patents, and find that the pledged patents have similar forward citations, but lower 
backward citations (indicating lower derivativeness) and lower claims (indicating narrower 
scope). In the current study, we compare the patents in the pledge (500 patents) to the 
control group (1351 patents). Table 1 presents our own tests of the differences between the 
treated and control groups in terms of the following observables: Forward citations, 
Forward citations up to 2005, Backward citations, Non-patent references, Claims, and 
Independent claims. Both groups of patents seem to have received a similar number of 
Forward citations and Forward citations before 2005 and they both seem to have relied on 
a similar number of references. On the other hand, the patents in IBM’s pledge seem to use 
more non-patent references, which suggests more closeness to science and a higher level of 
basicness. Our control group has a higher number of claims, similar to Wen et al. (2016), 
and a higher number of independent claims, which indicates a wider scope of knowledge. 
Overall, this evidence also rules out the argument that IBM could have pledged patents that 
were not valuable17.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.4 DATA AND METHODS 
1.4.1 Data 
To build the variables related to patent trading (i.e. selling and buying) activities, we 
rely on the Patent Assignment Dataset (PAD) from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) website (www.uspto.gov). Importantly, unlike licensing or alliance 
                                                      
17 Similar to the patent-level comparisons, Ayvazyan & Matr (2019) compare the treated and control groups 
in terms of the amount of patents by IBM and the total number of patents in the technological classes and do 





transactions, most patent ownership transfers are recorded by parties with the database, 
since legally, for the (re)assignment to be considered as legally binding18, it has to be filed 
with the USPTO. A typical transaction includes information on the buyer and the seller, the 
dates of recording, executing or signing, the number of patents/patent applications 
transacted per assignment, and the assignment type (Marco et al., 2015). Although the 
majority of the reassignments constitute an inventor-to-employer transfer of rights, we 
mainly consider inter-firm assignments of patents, as the latter are more reflective of 
markets for technology. Other types of patent reassignments that we do not consider as a 
buying or selling activity include name correction, government interest, and name change 
of the assignee. Since the assignee names are not disambiguated in the Patent Assignment 
Database, we follow the name standardization procedure from the NBER patent data 
project19 to identify possible IBM transactions. Finally, after identifying the bought and 
sold patents, we are able to link these data with other relevant data on patent characteristics 
from the USPTO database PatentsView20 that we use to construct our independent and 
control variables. This data is disambiguated for patents, inventors, assignees 
(firms/individual inventors). 
1.4.2 Empirical Model 
For the class-level analyses, we run the regressions under the specification of a linear 
estimator:  
,, 
                                                      
18 Marco et al. (2015) note that whether the recorded transfers accurately represent the population of the 
assignments remains an open question, since it is not mandatory to record the transfer of patent rights at the 
USPTO. However, interested parties do have incentives to record an assignment with the USPTO, as only 
those patent transfers that are recorded serve as evidence of ownership transfer in courts. 
19 Available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject. 





where j indicates the technological class, and t indicates time. For the error components, 
uj indexes a technological-class-specific effect and εjt is an idiosyncratic error term. Our 
baseline regressions take the relevant trading intensity as dependent variables (Yjt). We 
regress these variables on the degree of openness of IBM in the corresponding 
technological class, as measured by the class’ presence in the patent pledge. To capture the 
extra effect of the decision of opening up this knowledge, we interact the openness measure 
with a dummy variable for the years from 2005 to 2010. This approach involves a 
difference-in-differences with a non-dichotomous treatment variable (Openness) and 
dichotomous time variable (After 2005). In order to accurately estimate the precision of the 
regression coefficients, we cluster the standard errors at the level of the treatment 
assignment, technological class level. Since the variable Openness is time invariant, adding 
it as an explanatory variable is equivalent to adding the group means of this variable as a 
separate predictor. This approach is similar to the correlated random effects approach of 
Mundlak (1978). Moreover, we add to the model year fixed effects to control for the time 
trends in a flexible manner. 
We use an analogous setting for the patent level analysis, where the openness measure 
is captured with a dichotomous indicator (Pledge-Related Patent21) denoting if the focal 
patent cites any pledge patent, directly or indirectly. In these patent-level analyses, we use a 
difference-in-differences design with dichotomous treatment group and dichotomous 
treatment time and with standard errors clustered at the patent level. 
                                                      





1.4.3 Dependent Variables 
IBM Selling class and IBM Buying class. We build these variables for our class-level 
analyses (see Identification Strategy subsection above), to account for patent acquisitions in 
a specific technological class in a specific year. As noted previously, when identifying 
patent acquisitions, we exclude within-firm reassignments of rights – recorded 
reassignments from an inventor employee to an employer assignee (Employee 
Assignments) or reassignments due to changes in the assignee name or name corrections –, 
in addition to agreements of governmental interest. By verifying whether IBM is on the 
buying or selling side of the patent trade, we determine the number of patents sold or 
bought in each of the transactions, and then aggregate these values per year at the 
technological-class level. Hence, IBM Selling class (IBM Buying class) represents the total 
number of patents that IBM sold (bought) in a specific technological class in a given year. 
In some analyses, we also include the variable IBM Trading class, which we create by 
summing up the yearly bought and sold patents by IBM per technological class, to account 
for the firm’s aggregate participation in markets for technology. 
IBM Selling patent and IBM Buying patent. In the analyses at the patent level, our 
dependent variables related to the participation in markets for technology, are (binary) 
dummies that simply record whether IBM bought or sold the focal patent in a given year.  
Citations from IBM. We build the variable Citations from IBM at the patent-level to 
test our third hypothesis. This is a yearly measure, counting the number of citations made 
by IBM to level-one patents. To construct this variable, for each level-one patent in a given 





1.4.4 Independent Variables 
Openness. As remarked in our empirical model, the effect of outbound openness at the 
technological-class level, is captured by the interaction term between an openness measure, 
Openness, and the dummy After 2005. The variable Openness, represents the claims-
weighted count of the pledged patents in each of the technological classes22. Weighting 
these patents by their number of claims, rather than simply using patent counts, allows us to 
better reflect on the scope/breadth of the opened-up knowledge in technological classes 
(Allison, Lemley, Moore, & Trunkey, 2004; Novelli, 2015). Accordingly, the technological 
classes without any pledged patents obtain a value of zero in their openness score.  
Pledge-related Patent. To account for “openness” in our patent-level analyses, we 
create the (binary) dummy variable Pledge-related Patent, which indicates whether the 
patent is a level-one or level-two citation to any of the initial 500 pledged patents. In some 
cases (for Hypothesis 3), we specify Pledge-related Level-one Patent to refer to the level-
one pledge-related patent (i.e. taking a value of 1 if the level-one patent is pledge-related, 
and 0 otherwise).  
In Table 2, we describe all the variables used in our analyses at both levels. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                      






1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables at the class level appear in Panel A in Table 
3. For our sample period between 1999 and 2010, we have 1969 class-year observations 
belonging to 177 technological classes, in total, 50 out of which were to some extent 
opened up due to IBM’s pledge in 2005. The average Openness score in our panel data is 
80.5 claims and the maximum score is 2184 claims. On average, IBM files for 118 patents 
yearly in the average technological class with a maximum of 2020 patents in a class. The 
average technological class has 19045 patents yearly from all the firms in the market. From 
the same class in the same year, IBM buys slightly more than 11 patents, on average, while 
it sells around 24 patents. In Panel A in Table 4, we present the statistical correlations 
between our main variables at the technological class level. Analogously, Panels B in 
Tables 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix, respectively, for 
the main variables at the patent level.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Further, we provide some simple and preliminary statistics, exploring the differences 
between the pledge-related patents that IBM sold and bought in our sample, to get some 
initial insights on the characteristics of the patents in IBM’s trading decisions. We compare 
these two groups of patents, 549 sold and 453 bought patents, in terms of observables, like 
patent’s Forward Citations, Backward Citations, Non-patent References, and Independent 
Claims (see Table 5). While the forward citations received by the bought patents seem to be 





groups seem to be statistically similar. The two groups seem to be statistically similar also 
in terms of the number of the independent claims, indicating that these patents seem to have 
similar breadths/scopes. More interestingly, the difference in Non-patent References is 
extremely statistically significant, where, on average, the bought patents have higher 
numbers of non-patent references. In later analyses, we notice that the buying probability 
increases when the patent has more non-patent references, yet the opposite happens for the 
selling probability in the corresponding model (see Table 7). 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The pre- and post-trends of IBM’s participation in markets for technology, in terms of 
patent buying and selling activities in opened-up (treated) versus close (control) 
technological classes are shown in Figure 3. This figure suggests that IBM’s decision to 
open up its IP strategy was associated with an increased buying and selling tendencies in 
the opened-up technological classes. Arguably, the figure provides a preliminary support 
for the use of difference-in-differences analyses in our empirical approach, pointing out at 
acceptably similar pre-treatment trends for both variables of interest. Interestingly, one can 
note that the association between IBM patent trading and openness may seem to be lagged. 
We speculate that these “lagged” effects can be explained by the time that may be needed 
for the pledge to facilitate a market creation, which will in turn enable IBM to buy (sell) 
subsequent inventions from (to) others. In other words, time is needed for the demand and 
supply of technology to be developed so that IBM can internalize the externalities of its 
strategic openness. Our additional analyses (see Results section below) formally test for 





technology experienced a boost after the firm’s decision to adopt outbound open 
innovation, as proxied by employing the 2005 patent pledge.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5.2 Class-level Results 
We begin with investigating how the aggregate trading activities of IBM are associated 
with the variation in its strategic shift toward openness. Then, we study how IBM Selling 
Class or IBM Buying Class change with the openness level. Table 6 reports the main results for 
this part of the analysis. The positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term in 
column (1) in Table 6 suggests that additional 100 claims in an opened technological class 
are associated with 3.7 extra traded patents, either bought or sold, in that technological 
class after the pledging time, year 200523. Column (2) indicates that the total number of 
patents sold by IBM after 2005 in affected technological classes, increases by 1.6 patents 
with each additional 100 claims contributed to the pledge. Analogously, the third column 
shows that the number of patents that IBM buys also increases with the firm’s outbound 
openness. More specifically, IBM buys 0.4 patents per class with an increase of 100 claims 
to the openness of the technological class. The second and third models point at the 
direction that IBM gets more involved in trading activities, in general, after its decision to 
waive its exclusivity rights of its intellectual assets. However, IBM seems to be keen on 
selling more patents in comparison to buying patents. In relative terms, a one-standard-
deviation increase in Openness leads, on average, to a 0.053 (80×0.016/24) standard-
                                                      
23 Considering that each pledged patent includes, on average, 16.72 claims, this numbers imply that, on 





deviation increase in selling and a 0.03 (80×0.004/11) standard-deviation increase in 
buying after 2005. These findings provide support for our Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5.3 Patent-level Results 
To investigate the effect of the patent pledge on IBM’s behavior in markets for 
technology in a more direct way (for the first two hypotheses), we conduct patent-level 
analyses, where we check for the likelihood of a patent being sold or bought by IBM (IBM 
Selling Patent or IBM Buying Patent), depending on whether or not the patent is related to the 
pledge. We construct two different samples of patents to study the buying and selling 
possibilities separately. The sample for testing the probability of buying consists of both the 
level-one and level-two patents (both the pledge-related and control patents). For the 
analysis of the probability of selling, we build the sample from IBM’s level-one and level-
two (both treated and control) patents. The effect of interest is represented by the 
interaction term between the dummies Pledge-related Patent and After 2005. We control 
for citations received by the patent (Forward Citations), since that can be a signal of quality 
and potentially can increase the probability of being traded. Other controls are Backward 
Citations, Non-patent References, and Independent Claims, which can account for the 
patent scope and value. In addition, we control for the total number of patents IBM files in 
the focal patent’s technological class (IBM Total Patents Class). The results in column (2) in 
Table 7 imply that after 2005, IBM is significantly more inclined to sell patents that are 
related to the pledge. The probability of IBM selling a patent increases after 2005 by 0.02% 





does not seem to affect the probability of being bought by IBM. Overall, the results 
presented in Tables 6 and 7 give a strong support for our first hypothesis and a partial 
support for the second one.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
To test Hypothesis 3, which states that the focal firm internalizes the knowledge created 
by other players through building upon it, we analyze the effect on Citations from IBM to 
level-one patents before and after the practice of strategic openness. To do so, we first 
identify the pledge-related and the corresponding control group of level-one patents 
(Pledge-related Level-one Patent), after which we simply distinguish between whether or 
not the level-one patent belongs to IBM (Non-IBM Level-one Patent). The idea behind 
these classifications is to allow for empirically testing whether IBM will build upon the 
external subsequent knowledge more, in comparison to its own subsequent knowledge, 
which we will be able to capture by interacting the dummies Pledge-related Level-one 
Patent, Non-IBM Level-one Patent, and After 2005. Table 8 comprises a three-way 
interaction approach with the corresponding two-way interaction terms. We are particularly 
interested in the coefficient of the interaction term between Level-one Pledge-related 
Patent and the After 2005 dummy, as well as in the three-way interaction term. The first of 
these two coefficients of interest is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
IBM depends less on its own level-one pledge-related patents after 2005 in comparison to 
non-pledge-related ones (i.e. level-one control patents). More interestingly, the three-way 
interaction is significantly positive, which means that IBM seems to internalize the 
spillovers created by others using its liberated knowledge more than it uses its own 





hypothesis positing that the opening up firm will draw on the knowledge others create using 
its opened-up knowledge.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.5.4 Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
The potential confounding effect of OIN. In 2005, IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, and 
Sony launched the Open Invention Network (OIN) with the aim to advance Linux and other 
OSS programs. To become a member of this network, firms are required to offer their 
patents for royalty-free licenses and agree not to assert their own patents against the Linux 
innovators. The patents that OIN acquires from the outsides are also offered royalty-free to 
the members. This way, OIN’s goal is to create a collaborative ecosystem, a patent-non-
aggression community and protect its members from litigation and other types of patenting 
risks (OIN official website24). Since both the creation of OIN and IBM’s patent pledge took 
place in 2005, and both events represented a liberation of knowledge for the OSS 
community, one could argue that the results presented earlier in the paper could be driven 
by the launch of the shared defensive patent pool, OIN, rather than IBM’s pledge. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to address the potential confounding effect of the OIN’s 
establishment on IBM’s internalization strategies after 2005.  
In order to do so, we follow a similar approach used for our (original) Openness 
measure and create the variable OIN Openness at the class level, to capture the knowledge 
scope/breadth liberated by OIN in each of the technological classes. More specifically, this 
measure indicates the claims-weighted patent count of OIN patents related to a 






technological class j. While OIN owns more than 1300 global patents, we only consider the 
660 patents registered at the USPTO when constructing our proxy. 
To disentangle the impact of the OIN launch from IBM patents’ pledge, we run the 
main analyses with incorporating OIN Openness. In particular, in models (1), (3), and (5) in 
Table 9, we examine the effect of OIN Openness isolated from IBM’s pledge, while in 
models (2), (4), and (6), we consider both events simultaneously. We perform these 
analyses for the main variables of interest regarding IBM’s trading activities. The results 
show that the effect of the patent pledge is robust to accounting for the impact of OIN 
liberated patents. In models (1), (3), and (5), OIN openness seems to have no effect on the 
number of patents IBM sold, bought, or traded, respectively, after 2005. More importantly, 
the effect of Openness on the variables of interest in models (2), (4), and (6) does not seem 
to change when considering OIN openness, which provides additional evidence that the 
2005 patent pledge influences the changes in the firm’s behavior in markets for technology 
and its effect does not seem to be mixed with the effect of OIN launch. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The development of the openness effect over time. During our sample period, IBM did 
not add to the 500 patents in the pledge after 2005, which means that the shock was 
unstaggered and concentrated in the few years after 2005. To study the development of the 
effect of IBM’s pledge over time in more details, we break down the effect over the years 
following the firm’s decision. In our sample, there are five years after the announcement of 
the patent pledge, 2005-2010, with the first (second) block of analysis being the years 2006 
and 2007 (2008 and 2009), and the last one, being the year 2010. For all of these blocks, we 





to reflect on the concentration of the effect of openness, in terms of the closeness from the 
shock. The results in Table 10 show that the effect of the patent pledge on the variables of 
interest related to trading is concentrated in the second block, years 2008 and 2009. 
Overall, these results may suggest that the impact of openness takes some time to show up 
in the firm’s patenting and IP trading activities and fades away after a few years. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Economic effects. To get further insights on the economic effect of the patent pledge, 
we investigate the intensity of IBM’s inventive activities, as proxied by the number of 
patents filed by IBM, and its ability to create radical inventions, proxied by the number of 
radical patents. To construct the latter variable, we follow Eggers & Kaul (2018) measure 
of radicalness. Both of these aspects can help quantify the economic returns to adopting an 
open IP strategy, as these have been positively linked to firm value, firm future earnings, 
etc. (e.g. Mitchell, 1989). The results in Table 11 show that IBM experienced an increase in 
its inventive output in the technological classes, proportionally to their degree of openness. 
Analogously, the radicalness of IBM’s patents also increased after the firm’s decision to 
open up its IP strategy. An increase in a specific technological class openness by 100 
claims is associated with an increase in the number of patents produced by IBM by 9.64 
patents and 0.8 more radical patents after the firm’s shift toward openness in 2005. This 
positive association between the adoption of an open IP strategy and the number of total 
patents and the number of radical patents can be an indicator of firm’s value and its future 
earnings (Mitchell, 1989; Bessen, 2009). 
-------------------------------------------------------- 






1.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper sheds light on a new possible angle for investigating a firm decision to allow 
for inside-out knowledge flows for no direct financial benefits, i.e. strategic openness, 
prominent examples of which are patent pledges by various multinational giants. This 
behavior seems to contradict the traditional management theories that emphasize the role of 
ownership and protection of intellectual assets in ensuring value appropriation from the 
firm’s innovation. In this paper, we study certain actions of a firm after its adoption of 
outbound open innovation, in order to improve our understanding of possible 
internalization mechanisms. Mainly, we claim that the firm can capitalize on the 
externalities resulting from its decision to grant free access for its knowledge to the 
outsiders through two channels. The first channel involves selling intellectual assets in 
markets for technology to meet the hypothesized demand resulting from the increased 
engagement of third parties in the liberated knowledge. The second one refers to bringing 
the subsequent external knowledge in-house via buying intellectual assets in markets for 
technology or building upon them internally. We test our hypotheses using IBM’s pledge of 
500 patents to the OSS community in 2005 during the period 1999-2010. Our results 
suggest that IBM exploited the markets for technology options in the research lines related 
to the liberated knowledge after its shift toward outbound openness via selling intellectual 
assets. In addition, IBM seems to have kept valuing the subsequent knowledge in the 
opened-up fields created by others, evidenced by increased building on external patents and 
by increased involvement in buying transactions of patents in markets for technology.  
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on open innovation by investigating how 





proposed two channels. To the best of our knowledge, we provide a novel link between 
open innovation and markets for technology. While prior research has proposed that 
outbound openness may trigger a demand boost in the firm’s complementary assets (e.g. 
Alexy et al., 2018), in this paper, we show an augmented demand for the firm’s other 
relevant knowledge, which can be met through markets for technology. However, one 
should also analyze the costs of this practice and the forgone opportunities that the firm 
could achieve if it did not decide to involve in this practice. Such costs and opportunities 
can be related to potential licensing revenues the firm could make or possible benefits from 
blocking potential competitors from using its knowledge.  
Our study is subject to limitations. As we empirically examine the effect solely for 
IBM, the external validity of this study is limited, which means that one should be careful 
when implementing our findings in different contexts and for other firms. Nevertheless, we 
believe that studying a firm as big as IBM is still useful as a case from which other firms 
can learn. IBM is a big firm that provides a great variety for aspects to be explored and 
other firms thinking of adopting openness can infer a lot from it. These findings are 
expected to be more relevant and beneficial for firms with substantial resources and 
capabilities that allow them to employ the suggested mechanisms, especially in the markets 
for technology. Another related limitation for our study could be linked to the fact that we 
do not observe heterogeneity in terms of factors, such as firm’s size and capabilities, 
financial and intellectual, which may be essential when deciding to open up the firm’s IP 
strategy. Next, one other factor that we cannot account for due to our empirical setting, is 
the timing of openness adoption (e.g. earlier adopter vs follower) and how it could change 
the dynamics of our mechanisms. These could provide opportunities for future research. 





openness in another knowledge area. Since the fields of knowledge can be interrelated and 
therefore, dependent on each other at different degrees, one can think of considering the 
interactions among classes’ openness, especially the ones that are closely related to each 





1.7 Chapter 1 Tables 
Table 1: Tests of the differences between the treated and control groups of patents. 
Note: The column “Difference” represents the value from subtracting the mean of the control group from the 
treated group of patents. All variables are defined in Table 2. ***1% significance, **5% significance, *10% 
significance. 







Min Max Mean 
(SE) 
Min Max Mean 
(SE) 
Forward Citations 39.900 
(6.230) 
1 357 36.621 
(1.449) 
1 540 3.278 
(2.771) 
Forward Citations up to 2005 38.685 
(6.032) 
1 341 35.356 
(1.435) 
0 540 3.328  
(2.733) 
Backward Citations 9.900 
(0.994) 
1 56 12.249 
(0.469) 
1 263 -2.349 
(1.210) 
Non-patent References 3.510 
(1.263) 
0 177 2.723 
(0.204) 




1 57 19.583 
(0.359) 
1 120 -2.859*** 
(1.341) 
Independent Claims 3.594 
(0.323) 
1 17 3.905 
(0.073) 







Table 2: Variable descriptions. 
Variable name Variable description (all variables are yearly measures) Level of 
analysis 
Dependent variables Data source: Patentsview.org (patents, citations), USPTO 
(reassignments) 
 
IBM Buying Class Number of patents IBM buys in a given technological class. Class 
IBM Selling Class Number of patents IBM sells in a given technological class. Class 
IBM Trading Class Number of patents IBM buys or sells in a given technological 
class. 
Class 
IBM Total Patents Class Number of patents that belong to IBM in a given technological 
class. 
Class 
IBM Rad. Patents Class Number of radical patents (following Eggers & Kaul (2018)) 
that belong to IBM in a given technological class. 
Class 
IBM Buying Patent A level-two patent that is bought by IBM. Patent 
IBM Selling Patent A level-two patent that is sold by IBM. Patent 
Citations from IBM Number of citations each level-one patent receives from IBM. Patent 
Independent variables Data source: Patentsview.org (patents, citations)  
Openness Summation of the claims of the patents that were pledged by 
IBM in a given technological class in 2005. 
Class 
After 2005 1 if the (application) year (of the patent) is after 2005, 0 
otherwise. 
Both 
Total Patents Class Number of patents in a given technological class. Class 
Number of Patenting Firms 
Class 
Number of firms that patent in a given technological class. Class 
Pledge-Related Patent Pledge-related level-one or level-two patent (binary). Patent 
Pledge-Related Level-one 
Patent 
Pledge-related level-one patent (binary). Patent 
Non-IBM Level-one Patent 1 if the level-one patent does not belong to IBM (binary). Patent 
Patent age The difference between the application year and the given year. Patent 
Forward Citations Number of forward citations received by the patent.  Patent  
Backward Citations Number of backward citations made by the patent.  Patent  
Claims Number of claims of the patent. Patent 
Independent Claims Number of independent claims of the patent. Patent  
Non-patent References Number of backward citations made by the patent to references 
that are not patent. 
Patent 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the main variables at the class and patent levels. 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A.  Class-level 
Openness 80.560 267.172 0 2184 
IBM Total Patents Class 118.294 225.438 1 2020 
IBM Selling Class 24.043 72.601 0 2468 
IBM Buying Class 11.280 22.466 0 511 
Total Patents Class 19045.890 18759.940 35 96356 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 288.825 274.233 1 1639 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
B.  Patent-level 
IBM Buying Patent 0.0004 0.020 0 1 
IBM Selling Patent 0.0005 0.023 0 1 
Forward Citations  22.980 45.442 1 1083 
Backward Citations 35.423 53.281 1 500 
Non-patent References 10.627 17.676 0 100 
Claims 23.717 16.924 1 539 
Independent Claims 3.737 2.744 0 136 
Note: Panel A includes the descriptive statistics of the variables defined at the class level. The number of 
class-year observations is 19,045. Panel B includes the descriptive statistics of the variables defined at the 
patent level. These statistics consider both the level-one and level-two patents. IBM Buying Patent and IBM 
Selling Patent are binary variables. The number of patent-year observations is 308,307. All variables are defined 







Table 4: Correlation matrix for the main variables at the class and patent levels. 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 A. Class-level 
1 Openness 1       
2 IBM Total Patents Class 0.374 1      
3 IBM Selling Class 0.025 0.101 1     
4 IBM Buying Class 0.225 0.240 0.184 1    
5 Total Patents Class 0.157 0.661 0.192 0.383 1   
6 Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.118 0.354 0.153 0.395 0.843 1  
a VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 B. Patent-level 
1 IBM Buying Patent 1       
2 IBM Selling Patent 0.165 1      
3 Forward Citations  -0.005 -0.006 1     
4 Backward Citations -0.006 -0.008 0.096 1    
5 Non-patent References -0.005 -0.008 0.056 0.540 1    
6 Claims 0.003 0.000 0.149 0.102 0.120 1  
7 Independent Claims -0.001 0.001 0.103 0.023 0.038 0.450 1 
Note: Panel A includes the correlations between the variables defined at the class level. Panel B includes the 
correlations between the variables defined at the patent level. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 5: Comparisons between the pledge-related bought and sold patents by IBM. 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy 
Forward Citations 24.290 30.320 34.690 57.150 1 1 265 800 
Backward Citations 16.880 47.290 18.070 62.030 1 1 234 323 
Non-patent References 5.610 27.290 16.700 71.190 0 0 355 360 
Independent Claims 3.620 3.790 2.340 2.490 0 1 22 20 
Note: This table provides the preliminary statistics of the patents that IBM bought and sold during the sample 








Table 6: IBM’s total traded patents and total bought and sold patents in each technological 
class. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IBM Trading Class IBM Selling Class IBM Buying Class 
Openness 0.154 0.103*** 0.018 
 (0.257) (0.010) (0.011) 
After 2005 -0.340* 0.280 -0.305 
 (0.138) (0.698) (0.241) 
After 2005 x Openness 0.037*** 0.016** 0.004*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.001) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) 0.540 -0.096 0.006 
 (1.150) (0.087) (0.031) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.003* -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
IBM Total Patents Class -0.015 0.007 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.834*** -0.669 0.281 
 (0.620) (0.618) (0.247) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. classes 177 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-
effect linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological class level are presented in 







Table 7: The effect of being related to the pledged patents on the probability of IBM selling 
or buying. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES IBM Selling Patent IBM Selling Patent IBM Buying Patent IBM Buying Patent 
Pledge-Related Patent  0.035***  0.005*** 
  (0.003)  (0.000) 
After 2005  -0.086***  -0.004*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Pledge-Related Patent x After 2005  0.008**  0.0001 
  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Forward Citations (×1000) 0.488*** 0.268*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.003) (0.003) 
Backward Citations (×1000) 0.029*** -0.075*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent Claims (×1000) 1.950*** 1.110*** 0.004 -0.006 
 (0 200) (0., 193) (0.046) (0.047) 
IBM Total Patents Class (×1000) -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-patent References (×1000) -0. 361*** -0., 265*** 0.007** 0.006** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.006*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 181,794 181,794 263,215 263,215 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the patent-level analyses under the specification of a random-
effect linear estimator. The sample in columns (3) and (4) consists of IBM patents only, hence, the difference 
in the number of observations. Robust standard errors clustered at the patent level are presented in brackets. 







Table 8: IBM citations to the patents created using the pledged patents (level-one patents). 







Pledge-related Level-one Patent  0.060 -0.030 
  (0.039) (0.066) 
Non-IBM Level-one Patent  -0.034 -0.147*** 
  (0.039) (0.053) 
After 2005  0.0261 0.281** 
  (0.069) (0.126) 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent x Non-IBM Level-one Patent   0.194** 
   (0.082) 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent x After 2005   -1.088*** 
   (0.162) 
Non-IBM Level-one Patent x After 2005   -0.039 
   (0.148) 
Pledge-related Level-one Patent x After 2005 x Non-IBM Level-one Patent    0.958*** 
   (0.203) 
Patent Age 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Forward Citations (×1000) 7.430*** 7.430*** 7.430*** 
 (0.746) (0.746) (0.747) 
Backward Citations (×1000) 6.910*** 6.890*** 7.000*** 
 (0.276) (0.277) (0.277) 
Independent Claims (×1000) -2.720 -2.780 -3.120 
 (5.940) (5.940) (5.940) 
Non-patent References (×1000) 7.430*** 7.430*** 7.430*** 
 (0.746) (0.746) (0.747) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.948*** 1.932*** 1.984*** 
 (0.088) (0.097) (0.099) 
Observations 48,051 48,051 48,051 
Number of level-one patents 16,773 16,773 16,773 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the patent-level analyses under the specification of a random-
effect linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the patent level are presented in brackets. All 









Table 9: The effect of IBM’s patent pledge when considering the effect of OIN patents. 



















Openness  0.009***  0.004  0.013** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
OIN Openness  -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
After 2005 x Openness  0.003**  0.003*  0.005** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
After 2005 -0.089 -0.181* -0.052 -0.145 -0.142 -0.325* 
 (0.080) (0.096) (0.067) (0.100) (0.138) (0.179) 
After 2005 x OIN Openness 0.001* -0.0004 0.001 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) -0.023 -0.021 0.030 0.032 -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.023) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Patenting Firms 
Class 
0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
IBM Total Patents Class 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.0772 0.0425 -0.226 -0.106 -0.304 -0.0631 
 (0.109) (0.0967) (0.190) (0.132) (0.293) (0.215) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. classes 177 177 177 177 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-
effect linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological-class level are presented in 






Table 10: The development of the openness effect over time after the pledge. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IBM Selling Class IBM Buying Class 
Openness -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Years 2006&2007 x Openness 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Years 2008&2009 x Openness 0.006*** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Year 2010 x Openness -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) -0.028 0.017 
 (0.031) (0.015) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
IBM Total Patents Class 0.002 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Constant 0.109 0.0558 
 (0.091) (0.093) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. Classes 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-
effect linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological-class level are presented in 






Table 11: IBM’s total patents and total radical patents in each technological class. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IBM Total Patents Class IBM Rad. Patents Class 
Openness 0.960*** 0.018*** 
  (0.082) (0.006) 
After 2005  -12.450* -1.618*** 
  (7.342) (0.593) 
After 2005 × Openness 0.096*** 0.008** 
 (0.037) (0.003) 
Total Patents Class (×1000) -6.170*** 0.102*** 
 (1.190) (0.033) 
Number of Patenting Firms Class 0.426*** -0.005** 
 (0.010) (0.002) 
IBM Total Patents Class  0.064*** 
  (0.006) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Constant 8.537 0.890* 
 (8.456) (0.475) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 
Number of Tech. Class 177 177 
Note: This table provides the estimates based on the class-level analyses under the specification of a random-
effect linear estimator. Robust standard errors clustered at the technological-class level are presented in 










Figure 3: Average Number of Patents Bought/Sold by IBM from 1999 to 2010 for the 
Treated vs Control Technological Classes. 
 
Note: A technological class is considered as treated (control), if it includes (does not include) a patent that 
was opened-up by IBM in 2005. In addition, the control group of technological classes is restricted to those, 
where IBM had patented in significantly before 2005. IBM class buying (selling) represents the average 







Chapter 2  
Opening Up Intellectual Property Strategy: 
Implications for Inventor Mobility 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The search for new ideas is an essential part of the innovation process. Besides 
investing in traditional internal sources of knowledge, firms also exploit external sources of 
knowledge in their search for new innovative opportunities. The channels to access external 
sources of knowledge include strategic alliances and acquisitions (e.g. Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). In addition, firms often recruit outside 
inventors to overcome geographical and technological boundaries in their search for new 
ideas (e.g. Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003; Palomeras & Melero, 2010; Singh & Agrawal, 
2011). In fact, labor mobility facilitates the transfer of knowledge and potentially enhances 
the ability of the firm to exploit the outside knowledge. However, from the point of view of 
the firm that loses its inventors, that loss of human and social capital can have reverse 
effects on the firm (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011). For instance, competitors may "learn by 
hiring" from the firm and later use the acquired knowledge to compete with it. Therefore, to 
prevent the involuntary knowledge leakage via inventor mobility, firms have been 
employing various mechanisms, such as patents, secrecy, and litigation actions (Agrawal, 
Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009; Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agrawal, 2015). 
Surprisingly, with the growing prevalence of outbound open innovation in the recent 
years, more firms, including big players, like IBM, Google, Microsoft, Tesla, Red Hat, and 
others, have been voluntarily granting access to their (intellectual) assets to outsiders. This 
practice represents an example of the so-called “non-pecuniary” type of outbound open 





environment... without immediate financial rewards” Dahlander & Gann (2010, p. 704). 
Seemingly contradicting the proposition of the resource-based view regarding the 
importance of ownership and control of resources for appropriation (Alexy et al., 2018), 
these actions go against the knowledge protection mechanisms employed by firms. 
Therefore, understanding their implications on labor mobility represents an intriguing 
research question. The question of what consequences these practices may bring to the 
labor mobility of the firm opening up its intellectual properties (IP) is not quite 
straightforward and the literature provides little theoretical and empirical understanding on 
the direction of the effect. In this paper, I study whether the practice of outbound openness 
makes the inventors of the firm more or less mobile. Specifically, I focus on the effect of 
the firm’s openness level in a field of knowledge on the mobility of its inventors that have 
expertise in this field. 
Arguments can be made both for a reduction and for an increase in inventor mobility, 
following the facilitation of knowledge out-flow via opening up firm’s IP strategy. On the 
one hand, scholars argue that aggressiveness in IP rights’ use and enforcement can reduce 
employee turnover (Kim & Marschke, 2005; Ganco et al., 2015). Then, by considering the 
practice of granting access to the firm's knowledge to outsiders as a “soft” strategy, the 
firm’s inventors will become more, rather than less mobile. The reason is that with more 
openness, the perceived risks and costs of recruiting the firm’s knowledge labor will be 
reduced, resulting in increased likelihood that more inventors will leave the firm. In 
addition, it has been shown that openness in the innovation process increases the 
involvement of the outsiders, due to a reduction in costs and risks in using or implementing 
the opening up firm's knowledge (Murray et al., 2016; Wen, Ceccagnoli, & Forman, 2016). 





labor in the liberated technologies will increase. On the other hand, allowing for inside-out 
flows of knowledge may make the firm's inventors less mobile. The underlying logic is the 
following. By voluntarily granting access to proprietary knowledge, the focal firm reduces 
the incentives for outsiders to recruit the firm’s inventors. Thereby, the voluntary leakage 
of information can serve firms as a tool to reduce the drain of skilled labor embodying such 
information (Lewis & Dennis, 2001; Guarino & Tedeschi, 2006). 
As the theoretical arguments from the prior literature provide conflicting conjectures, I 
decide to look closely at the factors driving the effect. In this paper, I draw on arguments 
linking the degree of complementarity or substitutability of the inventors' tacit knowledge 
with the codified opened-up knowledge. Specifically, I suggest that in the presence of 
complementarity (substitutability) between the inventors’ knowledge and the opened-up 
knowledge, the mobility of inventors outside the firm is likely to increase (decrease). The 
main rationale I propose is that outsiders’ demand for the inventor will increase (decrease), 
when the inventors’ knowledge is perceived as necessary (replaceable) for exploiting the 
opened-up knowledge. I elaborate on the potential situations and scenarios where outsiders 
perceive the two types of knowledge, i.e. the inventor’s tacit knowledge and the opened-up 
knowledge, as substitutable or complementary. As such, I discuss instances when outsiders 
a) practiced inventing around before the decision of the firm to open up (part of) its 
knowledge, b) seek to commercially implement the opened-up knowledge, or c) aim to 
internally develop follow-up innovations. Section III provides reasons for why the 
substitutability mechanism is more likely to dominate. First, outbound openness per se 
reduces the outsiders’ need to invent around the liberated knowledge, which provides a 
substitute to hiring inventors from the opening up firm. And second, unlike the knowledge 





inventors with general expertise in the field (the focus of the current study), are not deemed 
complementary to the codified liberated knowledge in the contexts of commercial 
implementation or building upon practices. The reason is that these inventors do not 
necessarily possess specific information on how to commercially exploit or advance the 
opened-up knowledge. Thus, I expect that inventors with general knowledge in the field 
will experience lower turnover rates after their employers’ decision to open up their IP 
strategy. To gain further insights on the suggested direction of the effect, I investigate 
inventors’ knowledge characteristics that may moderate the effect of outbound openness on 
inventors’ mobility. Specifically, I hypothesize that a) when the inventors’ knowledge is 
more basic, b) when the inventors work with lower number of co-inventors, and c) when 
the inventors’ knowledge is in areas characterized with higher technological 
cumulativeness, the negative effect of outbound openness will be strengthened. 
In order to address my hypotheses, I utilize the decision by International Business 
Machines Corporation (IBM) to (partially) open up its IP at a specific point in time to 
analyze whether and how this decision changed labor mobility patterns. IBM is as a very 
good case, since it used to be known for a strict adherence to the closed model of 
innovation (Mayle, 2006). However, IBM made a radical shift to the open innovation 
model (Chesbrough, 2003), by supporting open-source software (OSS) through many 
actions, as such pledging 500 patents in 2005. I use this patent pledge as a proxy for IBM’s 
adoption of openness in its IP strategy in multiple areas of knowledge. By extracting 
information about IBM’s inventors and their patents from the USPTO database, I detect 
inventor mobility and investigate the implications of IBM shift to open governance of their 
IP’s on the leaving of their inventors. I use a special version of difference-in-differences, 





inventors’ knowledge openness. The results suggest that opening up the corporate 
innovation strategy, on average, lessens the chances of outbound labor mobility. 
This paper provides several contributions to the literature. First, by considering the 
complementarity and substitutability mechanisms between the codified knowledge and the 
inventor’s (tacit) knowledge, this study presents a new angle of looking at the dynamism 
between the knowledge flow and the inventor mobility. The main finding of this study 
suggests that strategically practicing outbound openness can bring along benefits of 
retaining knowledge workers for the focal firm. In addition, my findings support the 
proposition that firms “learn by hiring” where the knowledge is a driver for recruiting 
external inventors. Finally, this study contributes broadly to the literature on open 
innovation. Since the seminal work of Chesbrough (2006a), firms have started to 
acknowledge the importance of the so-called "outside-in" (i.e. inbound) and "inside-out" 
(i.e. outbound) knowledge flows (Tranekjer & Knudsen, 2012). The academic literature, 
however, has mainly focused on the inbound type of open innovation. By disentangling the 
effect of outbound openness from inbound open innovation, I attempt to provide a deeper 
and better understanding of open innovation phenomenon (Schroll & Mild, 2011). 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
By the end of the 20th century, the closed model of innovation has become less and less 
popular in the innovation management field. This innovation model is based on the premise 
that in order to innovate and remain competitive, firms should create and develop their 
inventions internally. In his book, “Open Innovation: The new imperative for creating and 
profiting from technology”, Chesbrough (2003) discusses factors and phenomena that 





increasing labor mobility, the enhancing popularity of venture capital, the ease of 
knowledge dissemination between public and private institutions, and the increase in 
competition. These changes in the business environment have made it more difficult for 
organizations to exclusively and entirely rely on themselves in doing R&D, and, thus, have 
urged them to make the firm’s R&D boundaries permeable, as the potential solution for 
their innovation practices, the open innovation model. In this model, profits and benefits 
from R&D investments are achieved by improving products and services in product 
markets, meanwhile the technology markets stay free and open, with the companies 
contributing to the growth of the pool of the common knowledge and even make profit 
from trading the firm’s IP rights (West & Gallagher, 2006). Dahlander & Gann (2010), in 
their paper where they re-conceptualize the idea of open innovation, define two types of 
outbound open innovation, “pecuniary” and “non-pecuniary”. The main difference is about 
the existence of direct financial benefits for the firm when revealing it knowledge. The 
focus of interest in the current paper is on the non-pecuniary outbound open innovation 
when the firm does not ask directly for any immediate financial returns for the liberated 
assets but that does not mean that the firm cannot seek indirect benefits. 
2.1.1 Labor Mobility and Knowledge Flow 
Labor mobility has recently received extensive attention in the literature and its impacts 
have been studied at different levels: individual, organizational, industry, societal, and 
global. For instance, employees’ inter-organizational movements have been linked to 
knowledge transfer and organizational learning, organization’s relational aspects, market 
entry, innovative capabilities and other sources of competitive advantages. Most of the 





on a single direction of the effect; namely that labor mobility affects knowledge transfer 
(e.g. Hoisl, 2007; Hoisl 2009; Kim & Marschke, 2005; Agrawal et al., 2009; Ganco et al., 
2015). The predominant findings suggest that labor mobility contributes to an increase in 
knowledge transfer and an improvement of the quality of the innovation process (Fosfuri & 
Ronde, 2004; Moen, 2005; Agrawal, Cockburn, & McHale, 2006). However, the effect of 
voluntary knowledge flow via outbound openness on outbound labor mobility is an 
underexplored side of the process. The direction of this effect is not clearly intuitive and 
arguments can be made to support both possible directions of the effect, i.e. firms adopting 
more openness could face higher rates of turnover, or else, they could be more able to keep 
their inventors from leaving. Next, I discuss the potential answers that the prior literature 
provides for the direction of the effect of outbound openness on the inventor mobility. 
Tough enforcement of the IP and labor mobility. Scholarly work on the effect of IP 
enforcement on the inventor’s exit decision established a negative effect. Mainly, the 
research in this area explores how actions, such as patenting and litigation actions, reduce 
the likelihood of skilled labors leaving the firm through building the reputation of 
toughness and increasing the perceived risk of poaching the firm’s inventors and using its 
knowledge (Kim & Marschke, 2005; Agrawal et al., 2009; Ganco et al., 2015). Melero, 
Palomeras, & Wehrheim (2017) claim that “patent protection turns the innovation-related 
skills of the R&D workers into patent-holder-specific human capital and therefore 
decreases inventor mobility” (p., 2). Therefore, one can extrapolate that openness, as a 
“softer” IP strategy and via reducing the risk of recruiting the firm’s inventors, will lead to 
an increase in employees’ switching jobs to other firms. 
Outbound openness and innovative activities in the market. Another argument 





knowledge labor is related to the demand for talents in the labor market. Specifically, due 
to the reduction of transaction and negotiation costs and the reduction of the risk of 
infringement and litigation threats too, the market entries increase (Murray et al., 2016; 
Wen et al, 2016), which means that companies are getting more involved in the opened-up 
areas of knowledge. This increase in the innovative activities may result in a demand 
increase for the specialized labor in the liberated fields. Accordingly, the inventors of the 
firm opening up its IP strategy might be more attractive for the outsiders in the labor market 
as their knowledge and experience are more related and closer to the liberated knowledge. 
Knowledge as a driver for labor mobility. One of the main arguments to infer that the 
adoption outbound open innovation decreases the rate of the employees leaving their 
employer is related to the learning by hiring stream of research. Following the resource-
based view of the firm, recruiting inventors from outside the company has been recognized 
as a mean to grow beyond what internal R&D would allow the firm to do. Moving 
inventors tend to utilize the knowledge they learnt from their previous employer (Song et 
al., 2003). However, recruiting external employees is associated with transactions costs and 
risks, besides; there are alternative competing channels, such as, alliances, networks and 
geographic spillovers, and acquisitions, through which the firm can get access to other 
firms’ knowledge (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). Therefore, in the case of outbound 
openness and opening up the firm’s IP strategy, the firm facilitates the knowledge transfer 
for the outsiders via granting free and riskless access to part of their intellectual assets, 





Yao (2001) 25 and Guarino & Tedeschi (2006) 26 suggest that firms, in fact, can use 
knowledge sharing/openness, as a response to losing key inventors. 
In the next section, I attempt to explain how openness in the firm’s IP strategy could 
potentially lead to these contradictory predictions. In the development of the hypotheses, I 
claim that the degree of complementarity and the substitutability between the inventor’s 
(tacit) knowledge and the liberated (explicit) knowledge is the factor deciding the direction 
of the effect of opening up the firm’s IP strategy on labor mobility. 
2.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This research addresses how liberation of knowledge affects mobility of the inventors, 
who have general (tacit) knowledge and experience in the liberated knowledge fields. I 
suggest that the effect of outbound openness on inventors' mobility depends on the extent to 
which the inventors' (tacit) knowledge is required and essential for exploiting and making 
use of the liberated explicit (codified) knowledge (e.g. in a patent). Accordingly, my main 
prediction in this paper relies on arguments related to the degree of complementarity or 
substitutability between the codified knowledge and the inventors' tacit knowledge and how 
it is altered by the outbound openness. 
                                                      
25 Lewis & Yao (2001) show through their model that even if the company adopts a closed model for R&D 
with no knowledge disclosure, there is a chance for information leakage from the company to its rivals, 
especially through poaching of the inventors. The authors also argue that openness can be a possible way to 
decelerate inventors' poaching by other firms. They claim that there are opposing preferences for openness 
between the firms and skilled labor, and that firms prefer more closed approaches to earn their share of rents 
and to protect their knowledge capital. On the contrary, inventors generally prefer to share their inventions. 
However, due to contractual incompleteness, the authors show that it is efficient for the firms to settle for a 
certain degree of openness in their R&D environment and to accept a certain level of turnover, which they call 
“Efficient Open-Constrained Equilibria”. In Lewis & Yao (2001) model, this is the 2nd best solution due to 
inability to attain the 1st best solution of maximum information flow. 
26Guarino & Tedeschi (2006) claim “knowledge transmission is a way to avoid labor poaching”. They argue 
that, in equilibrium, some firms may choose to share their knowledge with the outside parties, as a mechanism 
to attenuate the “stealing” of their specialized workers. The argument is based on the assumption that 
information leakage, spillovers, can happen voluntarily, – by opening firm borders, – or involuntarily, – by 
labor movement; – and these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In other words, by opening up their 





On the one hand, when the explicit knowledge opened up by the focal firm can be a 
good substitute to the tacit knowledge of the firm's inventors, the external firms are able to 
realize benefits from the liberated knowledge without the need to hire the inventor. The 
liberation of knowledge provides outsiders with the opportunity of accessing the knowledge 
freely, while avoiding the costs and risks of poaching external inventors, which would 
hardly be possible had the knowledge not been liberated. In this scenario, then, outbound 
openness would have a substitution effect on inventor mobility, meaning that the inventors 
would be less likely to be hired outside the focal firm. In other words, with reduced external 
value of the inventor's (substitutable) knowledge due to outbound openness, the inventor is 
expected to become less mobile, the higher the level of her knowledge’s openness. On the 
other hand, if the inventor's (tacit) knowledge complements the liberated (codified) 
knowledge, outbound openness is expected to increase labor mobility. In this context, not 
only would external firms need to pay royalties for using the knowledge, had it not been 
opened up, but they would also need to poach the inventor to be able to generate returns. 
For these firms, therefore, the reduced transaction and negotiation costs and risks of 
litigation with freely available knowledge would mean a decline in the total costs of using 
the knowledge. Hence, the demand for the inventors with complementary (tacit) knowledge 
is likely to increase after outbound openness. 
Further, I suggest that the demand for the inventor's (tacit) knowledge after outbound 
openness depends on the ultimate use of the codified knowledge by others. This will 
determine whether the inventor’s tacit knowledge complement or substitute the opened up 
codified knowledge. One of the situations in which outsiders might need the tacit 
knowledge of the focal firm's inventors is when they are "inventing around" a protected 





rivals' protected inventions (i.e. patented) may bear substantial costs and risks (e.g. 
Nordhaus, 1969; Scherer, 1972; Levin et al., 1987, etc.). Despite these risks and costs, 
inventing around offers outsiders the possibility to create similar inventions, while 
sidestepping the focal firm's protection. Hiring inventors from the firm that created the 
original knowledge in the presence of such knowledge protection means could be 
considered a feasible way to decrease the costs of imitation and overcome the appropriation 
mechanisms employed by the firm. These inventors are typically equipped with skills and 
knowledge, acquired via training and experience with their employer. Arguably, then, their 
tacit knowledge is highly valuable for outside firms willing to invent around the protected 
inventions. As the inventor’s tacit knowledge is viewed as a substitute to the protected 
codified knowledge, once the explicit knowledge is opened up, the need to hire the 
inventors will diminish due to the diminution of the need to invent around. In other words, 
when the focal firm practices outbound openness, outsiders no longer view inventors' tacit 
knowledge as very complementary or highly valuable for inventing around, since they 
simply no longer need to invent around. Following this logic, outbound open innovation 
would make the inventors less mobile. 
The tacit knowledge of the inventor that created the knowledge has been viewed as 
complementary to the explicit knowledge, when firms aim at commercially implementing 
the specific invention (Hegde, 2014; Maurseth & Svensson, 2015). The reason is that this 
stage often requires more information on the invention, in terms of more explanations and 
demonstrations for learning and testing the inventions, than one can extract from the 
codified explicit knowledge (e.g. patents). Thus, the "creator" inventor, who simply knows 
more about the invention, is especially valuable for those who are willing to transform 





outbound openness diminishes the barriers preventing the use of the inventions themselves, 
it does not in fact remove the need for the "creator" inventor's knowledge when they seek 
for commercial implementation. This is due to the above-mentioned complementarities 
between the "creator" inventor's knowledge and the explicit knowledge. However, for an 
inventor in the focus of this study whose (tacit) knowledge is general in the field and is not 
directly related to the specific liberated invention that the outside firms seek to 
commercialize, the demand for her tacit knowledge would not be as high. Hence, I expect 
that outbound openness will not increase the mobility of these inventors in these scenarios. 
One could argue that outsiders might be interested in the focal firm's explicit knowledge 
for building upon/advancing purposes, rather than commercializing or inventing around 
motives. In those cases, the same logic as in the case of commercial implementation can 
apply. The inventors who created the knowledge are specifically complementary to the 
codified knowledge in the case of advancing the knowledge. However, the focal firm’s 
other inventors who have expertise in the same areas of the codified knowledge are not 
specifically irreplaceable for outsiders. Moreover, the importance and dependence on the 
creating inventors' general tacit knowledge is relatively lower than in case if the outsiders 
are interested in commercial implementation or else, inventing-around. This is mainly 
because these firms have their own stock of (tacit) knowledge that they can combine with 
the codified knowledge and they may have their own trajectories and plans for the future 
development of the acquired knowledge. The latter, however, need not necessarily conform 
and fit the skills and the training of the focal firm's inventors. 
Altogether, once the knowledge is opened up, from the outsiders’ point of view, there is 
even less need of bearing the risks and costs of recruiting the focal firm’s inventors, 





to expect that the substitution effect of outbound opening up dominates the 
complementarity effect for the group of inventors with expertise in the fields of the 
liberated knowledge (e.g., not the authors of the liberated inventions in particular). 
Consequently, openness in the IP strategy will make these inventors less mobile. Hence, I 
state the main hypothesis of this study as following:  
Hypothesis (1): The higher the openness degree of the company’s IP strategy in a field 
is, the less likely the firm’s inventors specialized in this field are to leave. 
2.2.1 Interactions of Knowledge Openness with Other Knowledge Characteristics 
In order to provide more insights about the effect of openness on labor mobility, I 
examine, more deeply, specific situations by considering moderators that might accentuate 
the complementarity or the substitutability mechanism of the effect of outbound openness. 
For the labor mobility, the difference between the value of the inventor for her employer 
and for the other potential employers plays a big role in the exit decision (Palomeras & 
Melero, 2010). The contextual variables that play a role in the labor mobility process are 
multilevel including individual inventor, firm (previous and current employer), and 
environmental and industry levels (Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). Therefore, I explore 
specific situations that may affect the intensity of the substitutability and/or the 
complementarity mechanisms for further understanding of the relationship between 
outbound openness and labor mobility. For this purpose, I investigate the following 
moderators: the basicness of the inventor’s knowledge, the average number of co-inventors, 
and knowledge cumulativeness. 
Knowledge basicness. Basicness of the inventor’s knowledge, which generally captures 





to "applied knowledge". Being usually at its early stages of development and reflecting on 
the generality of the knowledge (Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993; Zucker, Darby & 
Armstrong 2002), the basic knowledge can provide third parties with more flexibility of 
combining it with their own stock of knowledge. While the field of knowledge and the type 
of the industry can affect the importance of basic versus applied knowledge, general 
predictions can also be made regarding the substitutability or complementarity between the 
inventor’s knowledge type and the codified knowledge. 
The next arguments suggest that in the presence of outbound openness there is a higher 
degree of substitutability between the inventor’s basic knowledge and the codified 
knowledge. Inventors with basic knowledge are more capable of helping the outside firms 
to invent around a protected knowledge, as the generality and the wider breadth of their 
knowledge enable them to create an alternative version of the protected knowledge without 
infringement. Then, when the need to invent around is reduced with more openness 
introduced in the field of knowledge, the drop in the value of the inventor’s external value, 
especially relative to the internal value, will be higher with more basicness of her 
knowledge. Since inventing around, as explained earlier, favors the substitutability 
mechanism, I expect that the degree of substitutability for the firm's inventors with basic 
knowledge will be higher, once the firm decides to adopt openness in its IP strategy, in 
comparison to the inventors with applied knowledge. 
Subsequently, I argue that the complementarity with the codified knowledge is higher 
for inventors with more applied knowledge. These inventors are significantly more 
essential for knowledge exploitation and commercialization. Since her (tacit) knowledge is 
closer to the market aspect of the innovation process, she has specific knowledge about 





inventors with more basic knowledge have lower potential input for sooner 
commercialization. Overall, therefore, after the decision of the firm to open up its explicit 
knowledge, inventors with more applied knowledge will be more likely to leave their firm 
due to the complementarities between their and the opened-up knowledge. 
Thus, I claim that the basicness of the inventor’s knowledge exaggerates the negative 
effect of her knowledge openness on the chances of leaving the firm and I state the negative 
moderation effect of knowledge basicness in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (2): The higher the inventor’s knowledge basicness is, the stronger (more 
negative) the effect of outbound openness on the inventor’s outbound mobility is. 
Co-inventors. Knowledge complementarity can be achieved through labor division 
among inventors, where dependencies are created on each other's knowledge in the process 
of replicating and producing new knowledge. Ways of capturing labor division include 
measuring the extent of using teams of inventors, which represents an informal 
appropriability mechanism, and the size of the teams producing the firm's inventions 
(Ahuja, 2007). As the inventive knowledge of an individual depends on other scientists' 
knowledge, exploiting her knowledge outside her original firm becomes difficult (Ahuja, 
Lampert, & Novelli, 2013). Consequently, the decision to leave the firm for inventors 
working in teams becomes less probable. 
Next, I argue that the knowledge of the inventors that work in smaller teams is more 
likely to be substituted by the liberated codified knowledge than that of the inventors 
working in larger teams. In smaller teams, i.e. with a lower number of co-inventors, 
inventors generally cover a bigger part of the invention process, which reflects on the 
broadness of their knowledge. Being knowledgeable of multiple perspectives of the 





outsiders. As a case in point, consider the case of a solo inventor, i.e. the inventor that 
works alone. As the only creator of the invention, this inventor possesses specific 
information about the whole procedure of developing the invention, from its idea formation 
to the implementation, as well as alternative ways of creating the invention. Therefore, for 
outsiders, hiring this specific inventor, rather than an inventor that is only responsible for a 
specific part of the invention, i.e. the case of an inventor working in larger teams, may be 
especially desirable, if they intend to invent around the protected knowledge. It follows, 
then, that when the codified knowledge becomes available, the substitutability with the 
inventor’s knowledge will increase for the solo inventor. Keeping this logic in mind, hence, 
the degree of substitutability between the liberated codified knowledge and an inventor 
with a lower number of co-inventors should, on average, be higher, than for an inventor 
with a higher number of co-inventors. 
In addition, considering the situation, where outsiders intend to hire the focal firm’s 
inventors for commercial implementation purposes, complementarities can exist between 
the liberated codified knowledge and the knowledge of the inventors working in both 
smaller and larger teams. On the one hand, inventors with a lower number of co-inventors 
can be essential for commercially exploiting the knowledge, due to their relatively wider 
coverage of the codified knowledge. On the other hand, inventors with a higher number of 
co-inventors can be valuable due to their networks developed while working in larger 
teams, as well as their experience in arguably more complex fields of knowledge. Indeed, 
firms tend to allocate more resources, including more inventors, when tasks are more 
complex. These two perspectives lead to the prediction that both “types” of inventors may 
be complementary to the codified knowledge, once it is opened up. However, in the broader 





of co-inventors is greater. While the substitutability mechanism explained above seems to 
prevail for inventors working in smaller teams, the mechanism of complementarity does not 
appear to be obviously stronger for inventors working in smaller versus larger teams. 
Overall, then, I expect that the effect of outbound openness on outbound inventor mobility 
would, on average, be more articulated for the inventors with a higher the number of co-
inventors. Hence, I hypothesize a positive moderation effect of the average number of co-
inventors: 
Hypothesis (3): The higher the number of average co-inventors whom the inventor 
worked with is, the weaker (less negative) the effect of outbound openness on 
inventor’s outbound mobility is. 
Knowledge cumulativeness. Knowledge cumulativeness is defined as the extent to 
which an innovation relies on the previous knowledge of its own technological area (Green 
& Scotchmer, 1995; Scotchmer, 2004). It captures, at least partially, knowledge complexity 
and system embeddedness (Weigelt, 2009). Unlike areas with low technological 
cumulativeness, those with high cumulativeness are characterized by higher values of prior 
art. Here, previous innovations implemented internally remain significant with knowledge 
advancements in the field, as by definition, the new knowledge needs to gradually develop 
on the existing knowledge (Lee, Park, & Bae, 2017). This feature, in turn, is associated 
with higher costs of inventing around and more possibilities of infringing on prior art 
(Scotchmer, 1991; Grindley & Teece, 1997). Analogously, less cumulative fields of 
knowledge represent fewer dependencies on prior art, hence, there are lower chances of 
infringement and less difficulties in inventing around.  
In this section, I argue that inventors with knowledge in highly cumulative areas are 





knowledge is essentially in areas characterized by a low level of cumulativeness. Inventors 
with highly cumulative knowledge are usually more acquainted and familiar with the prior 
state of art, which makes them more equipped for helping outsiders to invent around a 
protected knowledge. Due to the broadness of their knowledge, these inventors, unlike 
inventors with knowledge in less cumulative fields, can help reduce the risk of infringing 
on the previous inventions in the field, whilst creating and developing new alternative 
knowledge. It follows, then, that while in the absence of outbound openness, outsiders may 
view them as essential for inventing around purposes, if the firm decides to open up (part 
of) its knowledge, the need for inventing around and therefore, for these inventors' 
knowledge, will arguably be reduced. This is not necessarily the case for inventors with 
knowledge in less cumulative fields, due to their lower importance for inventing around 
practices. As a result, outsiders would view inventors with highly cumulative knowledge as 
more substitutable by the liberated codified knowledge, suggesting a stronger mechanism 
of substitutability for those inventors. 
Further, I argue that when outsiders are considering hiring external inventors for 
commercialization purposes, there is a higher complementarity between the codified 
knowledge and the inventors, whose knowledge is essentially in areas characterized by 
lower cumulativeness. The commercialization process does not in principle require 
extensive knowledge on the prior art, rather, it generally demands knowledge on relatively 
more recent advancements and their practical applications. With prior inventions becoming 
less significant at a faster rate over time in areas with lower cumulativeness (Lee, Park, & 
Bae, 2017), inventors with knowledge in these fields are more likely to be focused on the 
later inventions in their field of expertise. Thus, for commercially exploiting and 





relevant, than that of the inventors who have worked in areas with higher cumulativeness. 
This implies a higher (lower) degree of complementarity between the codified knowledge 
and the inventors with knowledge in low (highly) cumulative fields. Consequently, the 
effect of openness in the firm's IP strategy would be stronger for the inventors with 
knowledge in low cumulative areas. Hence, I hypothesize a negative moderation effect of 
knowledge cumulativeness in the following way: 
Hypothesis (4): The higher the cumulativeness of the inventor’s knowledge is, the 
stronger (more negative) the effect of outbound openness on inventor’s outbound 
mobility is. 
2.3 RESEARCH SETTING 
The majority of studies on outbound openness has focused on the outcome of 
collaborations and/or licensing transactions where the knowledge transfer flows in both 
inward and outward the firm simultaneously (Collaboration case) or the firm has full 
control on who can benefit from its knowledge and it is not free. Therefore, the current 
study focuses on a purer form of outbound openness, which can enhance our understanding 
of open innovation via disentangling the effect of outbound from the inbound open 
innovation. To address the research question proposed in this paper, I use IBM’s 2005 
patent pledge as a proxy of its strategic shift toward a significantly higher level of outbound 
openness in its IP strategy. Through this pledge, where IBM granted an open access to the 
community of open source software, I track the mobility of IBM’s R&D workers during the 
period from 1999 to 2010, in the middle of which the 2005 patent pledge took place.  
There are several reasons why the case of IBM provides a good setting to study the 





in the world and until now, IBM continues to be committed to open governance and in 
general, to the open-source community. A number of events in IBM's history have eased 
the shift of the company's strategy toward more openness. In fact, IBM used to be known 
for its strict adherence to a closed model of innovation (Mayle, 2006). However, the 
company made a radical shift to the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003) by 
supporting open-source software (OSS), initiating programs and communities, such as 
Apache and Eclipse. As a response to the market share losses to UNIX and Microsoft 
Windows NT operating system (Chesbrough, 2006b), IBM started to license its relatively 
underused technologies, and that served the company as a significant source of revenues 
over many years. However, the patent pledge of 2005, when IBM pledged free access to 
500 software patents for the open source community, was IBM’s most remarkable step 
toward openness. This event was dramatically different from any other major projects, due 
to the fact that the pledged patents were made public explicitly taking into account their 
considerable economic importance, as well as their coverage of multiple technological 
classes. According to Linux Magazine, the 500 patents “cost $10,000,000 to obtain (just in 
the U.S.) and are worth an unknown amount in licensing revenue”27. Besides, pledging the 
patents meant that no formal agreement was required for anybody to use them. IBM's 
patent pledge announcement (2005) claimed that its patent pledge was by far the biggest 
contribution to the OSS, in terms of the number of the patents. The announcement (2005) 
also stated that “Fostering Innovation, Interoperability and Open Standards” were the goal 
of the pledge. 






2.3.1 Endogeneity Issues 
There have been many speculations about IBM pledge regarding its timing, the areas it 
covers, its size, and the real intentions behind it. For the timing, this pledge came after 
Santa Cruz Operation (SCO) group sued IBM in 2003 for infringing its UNIX code 
(Goettsch, 2003) and, consequently, IBM responded with a counterclaim against SCO 
group and initiating a legal defense fund for Linux in 2004. In 2005, they pledged their 500 
patents to provide more security and guaranties to the OSS community. Despite the pledge 
goals stated in IBM announcement, “Fostering Innovation, Interoperability and Open 
Standards”, other motivations were suspected to play a role in this decision. Another 
potential driver for the patent pledge was the competition between Microsoft operating 
system, Windows, and Linux operating system, which IBM uses and installs on its 
hardware products. Therefore, IBM supporting OSS can also be interpreted as an indirect 
way to compete with Microsoft and its proprietary operating system. Another incentive for 
IBM adoption of outbound openness is related to the demand of the complementary assets. 
This big donation to the OSS community is an investment from IBM to increase the 
demand for its complementary assets and to boost the sales of its hardware products (Alexy 
& Reitzig, 2013). One more surmise about IBM’s patent pledge is linked to the debate in 
Europe about software patents, in which IBM was supporting software patents. Specialists 
suggested that the 2005 pledge was a signal from IBM to justify to European legislators 
that software patents are not an obstacle for innovation neither for the OSS community. 
Overall, though it is undebatable that opening up the firm’s IP strategy was an internally 
motivated decision, none of these actual or potential motives refer to mobility, which could 





seem to be among the proposed triggers of the decision. Furthermore, it is safe to assume 
that IBM’s patent pledge was fairly exogenous for the other firms in the labor market who 
are on the other side of employees’ job switching. 
One concern regarding the endogeneity of this research question is that the firm can 
decide to open up parts of its IP rights selectively in areas where the firm has a significantly 
high or low market power, which can affect also the probability of its inventors’ movement. 
In order to account for the issue of this omitted factor, I account for the firm’s power in 
each field of knowledge. Another internal factor that might affect the analysis is the 
simultaneous strategic actions the firm takes when deciding to open up its IP strategy. For 
instance, the firm can decide to offer the inventors with expertise in the fields of the 
liberated knowledge more incentives to stay with the firm, such as higher salary. However, 
if markets are competitive enough compensation offers should reflect the marginal value of 
the inventor for each company, and therefore mobility decisions should be mainly driven by 
the relative difference between the internal and external value of the inventor. This type of 
information about the internal incentives is difficult to obtain and control for. Yet, I include 
a variable reflecting on how much of the firm’s resources are devoted to each fields of 
knowledge in order to capture, at least partially, the change of the firm’s priorities among 
its fields. For the previous concerns, I cannot claim causality in my study regardless of the 
potential association. 
One interesting event, related to this study topic, is the crisis that the company faced in 
the early 90’s. IBM, close to becoming bankrupt, decided to hire a new CEO, Louis V. 
Gernstner Jr., from outside the company for the first time in eight decades. The urgent 
restructuring and cost cutting in the first few years of her tenure were associated with 





of the 90’s, the company reached the sought stability and recovered its leadership in the 
industry. This sequence of events is especially important for the current study, as 
technically speaking, it allows to check for the effect of the openness of R&D on inventors’ 
mobility, without much of noise from restructuring programs done by the company. In 
other words, the fact that IBM finished its short-term massive restructuring earlier than the 
treatment (the pledge of 500 patents for the sake of supporting the open source community) 
took place, makes my analysis of the effect of openness on outbound mobility less 
contaminated by the company’s economic contingencies. Hence, this study uses the patent 
pledge as a proxy for IBM's dramatic change in its IP strategy towards supporting and 
adopting open innovation approach. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.4 DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS 
2.4.1 Data 
Due to the lack of direct measures, it is not easy to detect the events of labor 
movements between firms. Many researchers have used patent data to detect mobility 
(Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Song et al., 2003; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010; Palomeras & 
Melero, 2010). Alternative sources for measuring mobility that have been used in the prior 
works include surveys and public data from LinkedIn website. In the present paper, I use 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database from PatentsView 
(www.patentsview.org) to collect the patent applications and citation data for IBM, as it is 
incorporated and headquartered in the U.S. This data is disambiguated for patents, 





2010. I analyze the dependent variable, mobility, for the period from 1999 to 2010 and I 
build the rest of the variables using the whole sample period. In my analyses, the 
observations represent an inventor of IBM filing a patent, which means that my unit of 
observation is an inventor-application year. 
Existing literature has recognized some shortcomings for using patent data to measure 
mobility. One of these shortcomings is the potential truncation of inventor’s patenting 
behavior (Palomeras & Melero, 2010). Truncation of inventor’s patenting behavior means 
the inventor is not recognized as a mover unless she files a patent with the new employer. 
Using patent data, the year of the inventor’s mobility cannot be accurately specified, since 
no information is available for whether he/she files a patent in the first or the coming years 
in her new job. In other words, the use of patent data can affect the accuracy of determining 
the exact point in time when moves take place (Ge, Huang & Png 2016; Melero, Palomeras, 
& Wehrheim, 2017). However, the fact that the inventor moved is the interest in my study 
more than the exact year of mobility. Another downside of using patent data to observe 
mobility is that the leaving inventors, who stop patenting after moving, are not observed in 
the sample. For instance, the entrepreneurs, who start their own companies, are unlikely to 
file patents, and therefore, will not be captured as leavers in this sample. After applying the 
restrictions and processing the data, eventually, the final sample consists of 453,575 
inventor-filing year observations for the period 1999-2010. It includes 116,557 inventors 
from IBM and its wholly owned subsidiaries. For the cases, when an inventor has more 
than one patent filed on the same year, I aggregate all patents of the same inventors in the 
same year in one observation since the effect of the inventor’s knowledge openness after 







Outbound labor mobility. In the current study, I detect mobility by following the 
patenting history of the inventors and the assignees, with which these inventors have patent 
applications. I manually collected the assignees of IBM and those of its subsidiaries to 
determine the inventors working for IBM. Technically speaking, the inventor is considered 
as leaving, once she starts patenting with another company for a long period of time, 2-3 
years, without appearing to patent with IBM anymore. To assure higher accuracy, I 
consider inventors that appear more than once in the patent records. Besides, I identify as 
“false” mobility the cases of cooperation patents, where the patents are recorded under 
multiple assignees, including IBM as assignee together with another firm, and I do not 
consider them as moving out events. 
Independent variables 
Degree of openness of inventors’ knowledge.  
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study measuring the openness of knowledge at 
the inventor-level. In order to create this measure, I rely on the openness indicator of the 
technological classes that the inventor’s innovations belong to. I use two different class-
level measure of openness. 
1. Openness (Unweighted): First, I identify the technological classes of the 500 patents 
pledged in 2005. I refer to these technological classes as the liberated or open classes. 
Then, for each patent, I create a dummy variable, indicating whether the patent belongs 





patents that belong to the open technological classes at each point in time when the 
inventor files a patent.  
2. Openness (Weighted): I construct the openness score at the technological class level, 
similar to Wen et al. (2016) method. I follow a similar measure using independent-
claims-weighted patents count related to each technological class as a better proxy for 
capturing patent value, scope and breadth (Cohen & Lemely, 2001; Allison et al., 2004; 
Marco, Sarnoff & deGrazia 2016). This way helps representing the level of openness of 
IBM in each field more accurately. In details, I count the total number of independent 
claims of all the patents in each technological class included in 2005 patent pledge. It is 
important to notice that the technological classes that are not present in the pledged 
patents score a zero in the openness measure. For each patent in an inventor’s portfolio, 
I identify its technological class and filing year, and assign to the patent an “openness 
score” accordingly. Afterwards, for each inventor, I calculate the average of her 
knowledge openness at each year of patent filing. Finally, for the simplicity of analysis 
and the interpretation of the coefficients, I use a standardized version of the variable. 
Moderating variables 
Knowledge basicness. The basicness of a patent and its closeness to science have been 
linked to the number of citations made to scientific references, i.e. papers (Agrawal & 
Henderson, 2002; Ahmadpoor & Jones, 2017). Therefore, I measure the basicness at the 
patent level by counting the number of non-patent references in its backward citations. 
Next, I calculate the basicness for each inventor at each year of filing a patent as the 
average of the number of backward scientific references in of her patents. 
Co-inventors. I use the number of co-inventors in each patent of the focal inventor 





2010). Next, I take the average of the number of co-inventors for the inventor’s patents up 
to each year of the latest patent application. This variable captures the difference between 
the inventors over time in terms of the number of co-inventors. This partially captures how 
much of a team player the inventor is. 
Cumulativeness. Cumulativeness of innovation refers to the extent to which the current 
innovations in a specific class are dependent on the previous knowledge of their own class 
(Caballero & Jaffe, 1993). Studies claim that cumulativeness of knowledge is a factor that 
may affect mobility (Clarkson, 2005). Usually, the patent “i” categorized in a specific class 
“j” in a certain year “t” backwardly cites other patents as references. These cited patents 
can belong to the same class as the focal patent, “nijt”, or to other technological classes. The 
patents cited in the same class represent a proportion of all the previous patents in that 
specific class, “Nijt”. For each patent, I calculate the proportion of “nijt/Nijt”, after which I 
standardize it by the application year. Clarkson, 2005, has a slightly different approach, 
which is used in Wen et al. (2016), too, mainly correcting for the fact that older patents tend 
to have higher cumulativeness, which might be for the reason that Nijt is smaller. In the 
current paper, the correction mechanism is simply done by standardizing with respect to the 
application year. After establishing an annual measure of cumulativeness for each class, I 
assign a number to each patent, according to its technological class and the application 
year. Afterwards, for each inventor, I take the mean of her cumulativeness of knowledge at 
each point in time of her filing a patent. 
Control variables 
Involvement. IBM class involvement encapsulates the relative importance of the 
technological class for IBM itself. This factor may affect the labor mobility, as suggested 





As a matter of operationalization, I create this variable by simply calculating the percentage 
of IBM's yearly patent applications in a specific technological class from the total number 
of IBM's patent applications. This step results in an annual indicator at the technological 
class level. Subsequently, I transform it into the inventor’s level via assigning a value for 
each patent according to its application year and its technological class and calculating the 
average for each inventor over time. 
Dominance. Inventor's IBM Class Dominance measures the importance of IBM in each 
related technological class. Following a similar approach as in Shane, 2001, and Palomeras 
& Melero, 2010, I create this variable by calculating the percentage of IBM's yearly patent 
applications per technological class from the total number of patent applications in that 
technological class. This index represents the firm’s class dominance at the technological 
class level. Subsequently, for each patent, I assign the firm’s dominance measure according 
to its technological class and the year of application. Then for each inventor, I calculate the 
average of the inventor’s IBM class dominance at every year in the sample. 
Experience. Most of the research in the labor mobility area includes individual's 
experience as a relevant factor. Studies on labor mobility are no exception. The variable 
Inventor's Experience is measured as the difference between the first time of ever filing a 
patent that was eventually granted, and the time of the current patent application. To 
account for non-linear effects, I also introduce the squared term of this variable into the 
analyses. 
Number of patents. This variable is the summation of all the patents registered under 
the inventor's name up to any specific moment in time. Number of patents is generally 
related to the characteristics of the inventor’s knowledge. Many studies use it as a measure 





Geographical location and time. The literature on labor mobility has established a 
strong link between labor mobility and geographical location (Almeida & Kogut, 1999). As 
IBM has facilities in many different locations across the U.S., I introduce location 
dummies, by states. To control for other time changes, not accounted for in this study, I 
introduce dummies for the application years into the model. These factors that are time 
related can be internal or external, as such are factors related to the industry, the legislation 
process, or any macroeconomic factors. 
2.4.3 Methods 
The main goal of the current study is to check whether the increase in the openness 
level of the inventor’s knowledge is associated with an increase or a decrease in the 
likelihood of the outbound mobility of the company’s inventors. Following the approach 
from Palomeras & Melero (2010) the dataset produced is an unbalanced panel, where each 
inventor “j” has Tj events of patenting, when she is at the risk of moving out. Consequently, 
the hazard function can be written as: 
δ (t+1, Z) = δ (t, Zt (t) | u, μ), 
where δ is the generic expression for the hazard rate of moving between t and (t+1). The 
functional form chosen for the baseline hazard function is logarithmic. The term Zt is the 
vector of time variant explanatory variables observed at time “t”. The term μ is the vector 
of parameters to be estimated, and u is a random variable that adds unobserved 
heterogeneity to the model and is distributed independently of Z and t. The term u captures 
the impact of omitted variables, particularly the inventor's personal characteristics (i.e., 
ability, education, age, gender, marital status, number of children, etc.). To model the 





(Yamaguchi 1991). In my models, I use a linear probability model (LPM) with inventor 
fixed effects, in order to control for the individual unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics, caused by individual-specific omitted variables. The linear relationship 
between the probability of the inventor “j” moves (Yjt) and the Openness of her knowledge 
is described by the following equation: 
, 
The coefficient of interest for the main hypothesis is "β3" as it captures the extra effect 
resulting from the firm’s decision to open up its IP strategy. "β1" refers to “hypothetical 
openness” for observations before 2005. Therefore, my model is a specific version of 
difference-in-differences model with a continuous treatment variable, “Openness”. For the 
moderation hypotheses, "β4” is the coefficient to look at to infer about the corresponding 
moderator in each analysis.  
Generally, the linear probability models, unlike the nonlinear model, such as logit and 
probit models, have the advantage of simplicity of the interpretation of the coefficients. 
More importantly, the interaction terms are less complicated to understand and explain in 
terms of their significance and magnitude. One of the concerns regarding the use of a panel 
data is the issue of heteroscedasticity, for which I use robust standard error estimates. 
2.5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Before testing my hypotheses, I compare the pledged patents with different sets of 





2005 patent pledge on new product introductions, Wen et al. (2016) compare the patents in 
IBM’s pledge to a randomly selected group of similar patents in the market and conclude 
that the pledged patents have, in general, similar backward and forward citations, and that 
the pledged patents have lower number of claims. Similarly, they compare the pledged 
patents to other IBM patents, and find that the pledged patents have similar forward 
citations, but lower backward citations (indicating lower derivativeness) and lower claims 
(indicating less resistance to invalidation). In the current study, I perform other 
comparisons, whereas I find that the pledged patents seem to have higher forward citations 
until 2005 in contrast to IBM's patent portfolio. The results are consistent both when using 
the normalized citations by the year of application and technological class, and when using 
the total number of citations. This comparison indicates that the pledged patents were of 
importance and quality, even before 2005, the year of the pledge. Thus, IBM's pledging 
valuable and significant patents for the OSS community can be interpreted as a sign of its 
strong commitment to the community.  
The classes, in which IBM chose to pledge patents, represent in total around 35% of 
IBM total patents with different percentages ranging from 0.06% to 3.42% per class. Wen 
et al. (2016) provide a comparison of the distribution of the pledged patents over the 
technological classes and the distribution of the total IBM’s patents portfolio over the same 
classes and they tend to be very similar, which suggests that IBM’s support to the OSS 
community is consistent with its IP right portfolio. In terms of the number of inventors, the 
pledged patents have on average 2.71 (SD = 1.5) inventors, while IBM’s other patents in 
the same technological classes before 2005 have 2.32 (SD = 1.8) inventors. By 
conventional criteria, this difference is considered statistically not significant. The pledged 





inventors of these patents started patenting with IBM at different rates at different points in 
time between 1988 and 2000. In IBM, 1086 inventors worked on the 500 patents in the 
pledge, with the majority of them contributing with one patent and the biggest contributing 
inventor appears on nine patents in the pledge. 
The sample consists of 1,178,491 of patent-year observations for 116,557 inventors 
who have worked for IBM at some point in their career. In Table (1), I provide some 
descriptive statistics on the variables used for the analysis at the inventor level for the 
pooled sample. As for the correlations among the independent variables, most of them seem 
to be normal and harmlessly low (see Table (2)). However, the Dominance variable seems 
to be correlated with the openness measures which points at the possibility that IBM 
decided to open areas where they have a high power and a strong position. Therefore, I 
control for this confounding variable. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.5.2 Main Results 
Using linear probability regressions, I tested the main hypotheses regarding the 
conditions under which the inventor’s knowledge openness is more likely to facilitate or 
hamper their mobility. In this study, I proposed two measures for the knowledge openness 
at the inventor-level; therefore, I performed the same set of analyses with both measures, 
separately, in order to confirm the results. 
Results with the unweighted measure of openness. Table 3 depicts a set of 
specifications designed to scrutinize the main effect of outbound openness on mobility and 
the moderating factors through five models that represent different settings and variables 





variables only (Model 1). Each subsequent model represents an essential modification over 
the baseline model. Model 2 includes the addition of the variable of interest, Openness, and 
its interaction with the After 2005 dummy variable. This model indicates that, in the case of 
IBM and its shift to openness, the average effect of inventor’s knowledge openness on her 
exit probability is significantly negative (significance level of 1%). As explained before, 
this observation is drawn from the coefficient of the interaction term between Openness and 
After 2005 dummy, which captures the extra effect of having patenting expertise in the 
liberated fields after the openness adoption time, 2005. In more details, the coefficient of 
the variable Openness reflects on the effect of increasing the proportion of the inventor’s 
experience in the liberated technological classes before 2005 and it seems to be 
insignificant. However, after the announcement of the pledge, inventors specialized in the 
areas of the liberated knowledge experienced a relative decrease in the likelihood of leaving 
the firm. In quantitative terms, the inventor increasing her proportion of knowledge in the 
liberated technological classes by 10% will be associated with an extra reduction of 3.36% 
in the probability of exiting IBM after 2005.  Keeping in mind that IBM inventors have on 
average 53.76% of their knowledge in the liberated technological classes with a standard 
deviation of 40.13% (Table (1)), one SD increase in the inventor’s knowledge composition 
in favor of the open classes after 2005 will make this inventor less mobile by 15% in 
comparison to the same change before 2005. The results shown in Model 2 provide support 
for Hypothesis 1, which means that the negative effect mechanisms are expected to 
outweigh the positive effect ones. In other words, IBM’s decision to open up its knowledge, 
in general, results in the outsiders becoming less keen on hiring IBM’s inventors and IBM 





Among the implications of these findings, one can firstly think that the relationship 
found in the literature for the creating inventors of the innovation cannot be extrapolated to 
other inventors in the area who, lacking the innovation-specific implementation knowledge, 
may have skills to invent around. Second, this finding supports the proposition that one of 
the main drivers for the recruitment of external talents is the knowledge of the inventors 
that they acquired in their previous employer. Further, both types of knowledge, explicit 
and tacit, seem to play a role in this relation and this observation is driven from the finding 
that granting access to the explicit knowledge reduces the employee turnover rate. As an 
empirical implication, these results propose that openness can be one of the options to deal 
with the knowledge spillovers through labor mobility. 
In the next three models, I incorporate the moderation effects (Knowledge Basicness, 
Average Number of Co-Inventors, and Knowledge Cumulativeness) separately in each 
model. In Model 3, I find a statistical support for the negative moderation effect of the 
inventor’s knowledge Basicness. The three-way interaction coefficient is statistically 
significant and negative. For the inventor with applied knowledge (Basicness = 0), the 
knowledge openness does not seem to affect her probability of leaving IBM, however, with 
each non-patent reference increase in the average basicness of the inventor’s knowledge, 
the effect of knowledge openness on reducing the likelihood of her leaving IBM after 2005 
is amplified by 0.025%. In short, there is evidence confirming Hypothesis 2. 
According to the results in Model 4, Co-inventors seems to have a positive moderation 
effect of the Openness on labor mobility. In this case, again, the focus is on the three-way 
interaction term, while controlling for the corresponding two-way interactions. Mainly, the 
number of Co-inventors seems to favor the positive effect of openness, which is inferred 





results of Model 4, knowledge openness reduces the mobility of solo inventors significantly 
more than that of the average inventors who used to work in teams. The effect of increasing 
the inventor’s experience in the open classes on her mobility is about three times stronger 
for the solo inventors (Co-inventors = 0) than the average inventor, according to a 
comparison of β3 in Model 2 and 4 (-0.00336 vs -0.00517). For instance, all else equal, a 
solo inventor with a certain level of Openness after 2005 will become less likely to leave 
IBM by 9.39% if she increases her specialty in the liberated technologies by 10% after 
2005 with keeping working solo. However, holding everything else equal, if the very next 
research project in the open technological classes includes her with other co-inventors so 
that Co-inventors increases from 0 to 1, then, the effect of the same Openness change on 
reducing her mobility chances after 2005 will be reduced to 7.59% (-9.39 + 1.8) due to the 
increase of her average number of Co-inventors by one. 
These results provide support for the second moderation hypothesis where the  mobility 
of inventors working in bigger teams appear to be less negatively affected by their 
knowledge Openness in comparison to the inventors with the same Openness level but with 
tendency to work solo or in smaller teams. With these considerations, one can argue that 
the internal value of the inventors, who are less protected by more Co-inventors, increases 
after the firm adopts more openness in its R&D strategy and the firm tends to keep these 
inventors. 
When examining the results in Model 5, which test the moderation effect of the 
Knowledge Cumulativeness, the three-way interaction coefficient is statistically negative 
and significant at 99% level of confidence. The effect of the inventor’s knowledge 
openness on her mobility possibility is significantly negative for the inventors with a zero 





Openness after 2005 results in an extra reduction of 5.17% of her chances to leave IBM, all 
else equal. For a corresponding inventor with only one difference in her Cumulativeness 
level, the effect of 10% increase in her Openness after 2005 is stronger by an extra 1.74% 
of reduction on her turnover possibility after 2005 for each one unit increase of her 
Cumulativeness. The results presented in Model 5 support the fourth hypothesis regarding 
the negative moderation role of knowledge cumulativeness in the effect of openness on 
mobility. Practically speaking, the adoption of outbound openness makes the employees 
working on the highly cumulative fields even less mobile if they are specialized in the 
liberated technologies. 
Results with the weighted measure of openness. By running the same previous 
procedures of the analyses, I create another five models with the weighted Openness 
variable (See Table 4). Taking into consideration that the two measures of openness are 
very correlated at the patent-inventor level with ρ = 0.637, it is not surprising that the results 
are very similar. The results from these settings (Table (4)) support the observations made 
previously. The main effect of outbound openness on the firm’s inventors is generally 
making them less mobile. In more detail, a one SD increase after 2005 in the inventor’s 
openness measured by the independent-claims-weighted patents count will result in an 
extra reduction of mobility by 3.17%. The average number of co-inventors seems to be 
positively moderating the main effect of openness, as shown before. However, one of the 
major differences between the two sets of results is that the moderation effect of knowledge 
Basicness is insignificant which does not confirm the second hypothesis of the negative 
moderation effect of Basicness through this analysis, as the three-way interaction 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the moderation effects of firm’s 





negative moderation effect of knowledge Cumulativeness is also supported by this analysis. 
These findings point at the direction of the supposition that the decision of openness of the 
IP strategy helps to reduce the hazard of inventors' moving out of the company when they 
invent in the more opened classes. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.5.3 The Timing of the Outbound Openness Effect and Other Robustness Checks 
As noted in the Endogeneity Issues section, IBM took other steps to support the OSS 
community in the years between 2003 and 2005 and the pledge arguably was motivated by 
the law case against IBM by SCO in 2003. In addition, IBM pledge was not the first action 
from the frim to support the OSS community; however, I use the pledge as a proxy for the 
outbound openness because I believe it is a better proxy and a better indicator to reflect the 
adoption of outbound openness. Therefore, to validate using the 2005 pledge as a proxy for 
IBM’s shift to outbound open innovation and understand the effect of these events 
happened in 2003 and 2004 on the labor mobility, I inspect the existence of “pre-trend” by 
interacting the openness measure with After 2003 and After 2004 dummies. I added these 
interactions separately and together in the Models 1-3 in Table 5 and the main take away 
from these analyses that the opposite and insignificant effect of these pre-trend indicators, 
the interactions of Openness with After 2003 and After 2004 dummies, does not confirm the 
existence of the pre-trend. These results validate the After 2005 timing for the openness 
shock in my analyses, besides, confirm the direction of the effect to be negative. 
In another robustness test, I check the continuation of the openness effect on the long-
term. I run the main analysis for the years between 2010 and 2015 in Model 4. The 





the size of the pledge after 2005. The results of Model 4 show that the effect of patenting in 
the liberated areas seems to fade away which emphasizes the effect around the shock time, 
2005. I perform these robustness checks for the two different measures of openness and I 
present them in Table 5 for the unweighted measure and in Table 6 for the weighted 
measure. 
As a robustness check and for additional support for the main findings, I used logit 
models for the main analyses. The results are consistent among all the methods. Moreover, 
the two different ways used to measure openness, besides the fact that I use panel data, 
even strengthen the robustness of my results. In addition, the inventor fixed effect 
controlled for in the analysis rules out the effect of the inventor’s time invariant factors. As 
explained in the Endogeneity Issues section, I include the firm’s involvement in each field 
of knowledge and its dominance as a proxy for the market power to account for specific 
concerns. The time and location fixed effects are also provided in the analyses to provide 
better estimations of the variables of interest. Clustering error at the treatment level controls 
for within-cluster error correlation in order to make sure that the model is robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Lastly, I run the regression with a different measure 
of inventor’s openness where I use a dummy that equals one for the inventors who either 
cited the pledged patents or cooperated with at least one of the inventors who created the 
pledged patents. It is an alternative way of measuring the inventor’s involvement in the 
liberated areas. The results from this regression confirm the main finding that, after 2005, 
the inventors with related knowledge to the opened-up knowledge are less likely to leave 
IBM (Results can be provided upon request). 
-------------------------------------------------------- 






2.5.4 The Effect of Openness on Labor Mobility over Time 
The main finding of the study is that firm’s openness of its IP strategy is associated with 
a reduction in the firm’s inventors’ outbound mobility. In order to study the effect 
development over time, I break down the impact into smaller periods after the firm’s shift 
towards outbound openness. In more details, I consider each two years in the treatment 
period as a singular block, Years 2005 & 2006, Years 2007 & 2008 and Years 2009 & 
2010. Next, I interact these time dummy variables with the openness measures, weighted 
and unweighted. Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 illustrate the results of this analysis. The effect 
of the firm’s openness seems to be consistently reducing the outbound mobility over the 
period after the shock.  This finding is supported by Figueres 2 and 3 where I present the 
coefficient of the interactions between openness measures and each year binary variable. 
The figures show that patenting in the fields that IBM decided to open up seem to be 
associated with increasing labor outbound mobility. However, after 2005 the intensity of 
this effect is substantially dropped. The change in the effect of inventor’s knowledge 
openness from increasing labor mobility before 2005 to no effect or a smaller effect after 
2005 confirm the main finding of this study that opening-up the firm’s IP strategy tends to 
reduce the likelihood of its inventors to leave the firm.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
2.6 DISCUSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The current paper provides a novel perspective to look at the relationship between the 





and substitutability mechanisms between the codified knowledge and the inventor’s (tacit) 
knowledge. This discussion help understanding the possible conflicting predictions of the 
effect of opening the firm’s IP strategy on its skilled labor mobility. For the inventors with 
experience in the fields of the liberated knowledge, I argue that the substitutability 
mechanism dominates and the effect is in the direction of making these inventors less 
mobile proportionally with their experience in these fields of knowledge. 
As a result of opening up the corporate innovation strategy, resources become available 
for free to the public. This creates an opportunity for other companies to make use of the 
made-free resources, such as intellectual property that are practically hard to defend and 
appropriate. This spillovers issue creates a misappropriation problem for the focal firm and 
makes their inventors more attractive for the outsiders. In practice, there are many different 
formal and informal mechanisms that firms use to deal with the problem of 
misappropriation, as such are the non-compete covenants, trade secrets, patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, confidentiality agreements, building reputation of toughness 
through litigiousness, and other methods (Kim & Marschke, 2005; Agrawal et al., 2009). 
R&D labor mobility among firms is recognized as one of the main channels of 
misappropriation. Firms, especially R&D-intense firms, make significant investments in 
their inventors, and these inventors usually carry the firms’ tacit knowledge. This is why 
firms employ various mechanisms to prevent inventor mobility or at least to prevent the 
inventors from exposing firm specific knowledge. 
In the current paper, I claim that opening up the corporate innovation strategy, 
generally, has the potential to increase, as well as, to decrease the labor outbound mobility. 
In the case of IBM and its 2005 patent pledge, the average effect found in the current paper 





with another possibility for maintaining and protecting their skilled R&D labor. 
Traditionally, firms have gone for the aggressive options of enforcing their intellectual 
property, like patent litigation (Agrawal et al., 2009; and Ganco et al., 2015). Additionally, 
the results of this paper imply that firms may find it beneficial to share their knowledge and 
to open up their R&D borders, in order to keep their inventors for their special value to the 
firm. 
I recognize that there could be alternative explanations for the results presented in this 
study. One potential explanation for the reduced mobility after openness is that the 
employees perceive the firm decision to adopt openness positively and they decide to stay 
with the firm. The employees may value this kind of practices from their employer and 
consider the social status of working for such a firm as a sort of compensation. Another 
potential explanation is related to the strategic planning of the focal firm. As the firm may 
anticipate that its decision to open up its IP’s motivate the outsiders to create more 
innovation in these areas, then, the focal firm might decide to retain its inventors in these 
areas in order to be able to exploit these follow-up inventions by others. These possible 
mechanisms represent an opportunity for future work and an extension of this study. 
The findings of this study contribute to the decision about which parts of the knowledge 
to open up, to be able to anticipate how and to what extent that openness will affect the 
firm. I contribute to this facet of the innovation model's openness by looking at how some 
characteristics of the inventor’s knowledge moderate the effect of openness on the 
outbound labor mobility. The characteristics considered in this research cover general 
aspects of each area of knowledge, such as knowledge basicness, number of co-inventors, 
and cumulativeness. These characteristics, when reflected on the inventor’s knowledge and 





adopting openness should consider them. When firms choose to incorporate more openness 
in their IP strategy, but at the same time want to protect their R&D labor, firms should 
choose to open up technological classes with low knowledge complementarity, high 
basicness, or/and high cumulativeness. As shown in the empirical analyses these 
moderators can alter and change the effect of openness on labor mobility, significantly. 
Previous studies find that more protection and toughness in the IP approach reduces the 
likelihood of employees' exit decisions. However, this paper claims that more openness also 
reduces outbound labor mobility. Therefore, there are two possibilities to reduce inventors’ 
movement out of the firm and the firm should decide which option to choose: going for 
more toughness or more openness. If the goal is to protect and maintain the human capital 
of the company, especially their stock of inventors, then the decision should consider the 
costs of the appropriability mechanisms, such as patent enforcements, litigiousness and 
other IP protection activities, versus the costs and hazards resulting from adopting more 
openness in the innovation model. 
Considering the limitations of the current paper, this study cannot infer much about the 
effect of the adoption time (whether the company is an early adopter of openness in its 
industry or it is a late follower), and whether/how the adoption time would change the 
effect of openness on mobility. This is mainly due to the fact that I consider only one 
company in my analysis, which, additionally, limits the external validity of this study. 
Lastly, it is important to note that throughout this study I assume that openness in one class 
has no effect on the openness degree of the other classes. Thus, one can think of 
considering the inter-classes openness’ interactions, especially the closely related classes, 





2.7 Chapter 2 Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Labor mobility – pre 2005 0.0074 .0857 0 1 
Labor mobility – post 2005 0.0073 .0854 0 1 
Openness (Unweighted) 0.538 0.401 0 1 
Openness (Weighted)  0.103 1.075 -0.6 4.789 
Basicness 4.718 14.252 0 967 
Co-inventors 2.871 1.829 0 62.500 
Cumulativeness -0.068 0.211 -0.401 16.251 
Involvement 0.019 0.017 0 0.500 
Dominance 0.142 0.083 0 0.757 
Experience 8.402 8.262 0 57 
No. of Patents 16.569 31.040 1 973 
Note: These statistics are for the variables before standardizing 
Table 2: Correlations between the main variables in the panel data 
# Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 Openness (Unweighted) 1.000         
2 Openness (Weighted) 0.637 1.000        
3 Basicness 0.102 0.101 1.000       
4 Co-inventors -0.004 0.059 0.115 1.000      
5 Cumulativeness 0.122 0.074 -0.011 -0.038 1.000     
6 Involvement -0.101 0.232 -0.022 0.060 -0.354 1.000    
7 Dominance 0.396 0.713 0.022 0.038 0.076 0.482 1.000   
8 Experience -0.091 -0.192 -0.052 -0.047 0.083 -0.222 -0.272 1.000  






Table 3: LPM Fixed Effect on the Probability of an Inventor’s Exit with the Unweighted Openness 
Measure: Coefficients’ Estimate 
Note: Estimates based on the inventor-level analyses over a sample of inventor-year observations under the 
specification of a fixed-effect LPM. Robust standard errors clustered at inventor-level are in brackets. ***1% 
significance, **5% significance, *10% significance. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)  
Openness   0.00232 0.00112 -0.00029 0.00154  
   (0.00187) (0.00168) (0.00206) (0.00168)  
After 2005 × Openness  -0.00336*** -0.00256** -0.00939*** -0.00517***  
   (0.00129) (0.00131) (0.00223) (0.00135)  
Basicness -4.50e-05 -4.25e-05 -3.88e-06 -4.26e-05* -5.11e-05**  
  (2.84e-05) (2.84e-05) (7.07e-05) (2.57e-05) (2.57e-05)  
Co-inventors -0.00129*** -0.00128*** -0.00118*** -0.00098** -0.00119***  
  (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00020) (0.00041) (0.00020)  
Cumulativeness 0.00078 9.88e-05 -0.00138 -0.00123 -0.00716**  
  (0.00230) (0.00233) (0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00323)  






























After 2005 × Co-inventors  
  
0.00040   
   
  
(0.00045)   
Openness × Co-inventors  
  
-0.00311***   
   
  
(0.00047)   
After 2005 × Openness × Co-inventors  
  
0.00179***   
   
  
(0.00056)   
After 2005 × Cumulativeness  
  
 0.0110***  
   
  
 (0.00403)  
Openness × Cumulativeness  
  
 0.00808*  
   
  
 (0.00427)  
After 2005 × Openness × Cumulativeness  
  
 -0.01740***  
   
  
 (0.00571)  
Involvement -0.32500*** -0.33600*** -0.35300*** -0.35000*** -0.34800***  
 (0.03620) (0.03720) (0.03390) (0.03380) (0.03470)  
Dominance -0.02950*** -0.02930*** -0.01200 -0.01050 -0.01340*  
 (0.00853) (0.00859) (0.00767) (0.00767) (0.00777)  
Experience 0.00813*** 0.00831*** 0.00718*** 0.00804*** 0.00732***  
  (0.00016) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00021) (0.00017)  
Experience2 -5.05e-05*** -5.16e-05*** -4.82e-05*** -4.97e-05*** -4.81e-05***  
  (5.06e-06) (5.09e-06) (4.89e-06) (4.87e-06) (4.93e-06)  
No. of Patents -0.00017*** -0.00017*** -0.00018*** -0.00018*** -0.00018***  
  (4.48e-05) (4.49e-05) (4.81e-05) (4.73e-05) (4.82e-05)  
Year and State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -0.03170*** -0.03310*** -0.02890*** -0.03120*** -0.02950***  
Observations 453,575 453,575 453,575 453,575 453,575  





Table 4: LPM Fixed Effect on the Probability of an Inventor’s Exit with the Weighted Openness 
Measure: Coefficients’ Estimate 
Note: Estimates based on the inventor-level analyses over a sample of inventor-year observations under the 
specification of a fixed-effect LPM. Robust standard errors clustered at inventor-level are in brackets. ***1% 
significance, **5% significance, *10% significance. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Openness   0.00425*** 0.00327*** 0.00292*** 0.00324*** 
   (0.00064) (0.00059) (0.00069) (0.00059) 
After 2005 × Openness  -0.00317*** -0.00294*** -0.00430*** -0.00332*** 
   (0.00043) (0.00045) (0.00070) (0.00046) 
Basicness -4.50e-05 -4.12e-05 -7.12e-05* -4.22e-05 -4.98e-05* 
  (2.84e-05) (2.84e-05) (4.22e-05) (2.57e-05) (2.57e-05) 
Co-inventors -0.00129*** -0.00127*** -0.00118*** -0.000782*** -0.00118*** 
  (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00020) (0.00023) (0.00020) 
Cumulativeness 0.00078 -0.00039 -0.00162 -0.00146 -0.00193 
  (0.00230) (0.00233) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00227) 
























After 2005 × Co-inventors  
  
7.82e-05  
   
  
(0.00014)  
Openness × Co-inventors  
  
-0.00202***  
   
  
(0.00026)  
After 2005 × Openness × Co-inventors  
  
0.00047***  
   
  
(0.00015)  
After 2005 × Cumulativeness  
  
 0.00161 
   
  
 (0.00174) 
Openness × Cumulativeness  
  
 -0.00121 
   
  
 (0.00265) 
After 2005 × Openness × Cumulativeness  
  
 -0.00584** 
   
  
 (0.00236) 
Involvement -0.32500*** -0.35500*** -0.36100*** -0.35500*** -0.35900*** 
 (0.03620) (0.03690) (0.03360) (0.03340) (0.03460) 
|Dominance -0.02950*** -0.04770*** -0.02590*** -0.02480*** -0.02560*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00912) (0.00812) (0.00812) (0.00851) 
Experience 0.00813*** 0.00824*** 0.00713*** 0.00765*** 0.00715*** 
  (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00017) (0.00015) 
Experience
2
 -5.05e-05*** -5.55e-05*** -5.15e-05*** -5.29e-05*** -5.15e-05*** 
  (5.06e-06) (5.14e-06) (4.93e-06) (4.91e-06) (4.97e-06) 
No. of Patents -0.00017*** -0.00018*** -0.00018*** -0.00018*** -0.00019*** 
  (4.48e-05) (4.51e-05) (4.83e-05) (4.76e-05) (4.84e-05) 
Year and State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.03170*** -0.02890*** -0.02610*** -0.02840*** -0.02640*** 
Observations 453,575 453,575 453,575 453,575 453,575 





Table 5: Robustness Tests (Openness - Unweighted) 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Openness (Unweighted) 0.00180 0.00203 0.00180 0.00067 
  (0.00193) (0.00189) (0.00193) (0.00236) 
After 2003 × Openness  0.00197  0.00135  
  (0.00150)  (0.00177)  
After 2004 × Openness   0.00224 0.00122  
   (0.00171) (0.00201)  
After 2005 × Openness -0.00450*** -0.00509*** -0.00509***  
  (0.00143) (0.00171) (0.00171)  
Basicness -4.32e-05 -4.31e-05 -4.33e-05 -4.74e-05 
  (2.84e-05) (2.84e-05) (2.84e-05) (8.88e-05) 
Co-inventors -0.00128*** -0.00128*** -0.00128*** 0.00105 
  (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00089) 
Cumulativeness 0.000278 0.00022 0.00029 -0.00328 
  (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00388) 
Involvement -0.3330*** -0.3350*** -0.3330*** -0.1370*** 
  (0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0523) 
Dominance -0.0296*** -0.0296*** -0.0296*** -0.0167 
  (0.00860) (0.00860) (0.00860) (0.0214) 
Experience 0.00827*** 0.00828*** 0.00827*** 0.00529*** 
  (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00038) 
Experience2 -5.14e-05*** -5.15e-05*** -5.14e-05*** -2.85e-05*** 
  (5.09e-06) (5.09e-06) (5.09e-06) (1.01e-05) 
No. Of Patents -0.00017*** -0.00017*** -0.00017*** -1.82e-05 
  (4.49e-05) (4.49e-05) (4.49e-05) (1.79e-05) 
Year and State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.03270*** -0.03290*** -0.03270*** -0.04340*** 
Observations 453,575 453,575 453,575 141,431 
Number of Inventors  116,557 116,557 116,557 64,514 
Note: Estimates based on the inventor-level analyses over a sample of inventor-year observations under the 
specification of a fixed-effect LPM. Sample in model 4 differs because of the different time period. Robust 






Table 6: Robustness Tests (Openness - Weighted) 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Openness  0.00469*** 0.00476*** 0.00467*** 0.00182 
 (0.00074) (0.00070) (0.00074) (0.00168) 
After 2005 × Openness  -0.00322*** -0.00250*** -0.00250***  
 (0.00050) (0.00058) (0.00058)  
After 2003 × Openness  -0.00036  0.00045  
 (0.00057)  (0.00068)  
After 2004 × Openness  -0.00122** -0.00154**  
  (0.00061) (0.00071)  
Basicness -4.09e-05 -4.02e-05 -4.03e-05 -4.39e-05 
  (2.84e-05) (2.84e-05) (2.84e-05) (8.90e-05) 
Co-inventors -0.00127*** -0.00127*** -0.00127*** 0.00104 
  (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00089) 
Cumulativeness -9.68e-05 -0.00011 -0.00010 -0.00046 
 (0.000492) (0.000492) (0.000492) (0.00121) 
Involvement -0.3540*** -0.3530*** -0.3530*** -0.09850** 
 (0.03690) (0.03690) (0.03690) (0.04910) 
Dominance -0.04770*** -0.04760*** -0.04760*** -0.02850 
 (0.00911) (0.00912) (0.00911) (0.02290) 
Experience 0.00821*** 0.00822*** 0.00821*** 0.00512*** 
 (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00037) 
Experience2 -5.56e-05*** -5.59e-05*** -5.58e-05*** -2.67e-05*** 
 (5.16e-06) (5.16e-06) (5.16e-06) (9.96e-06) 
No. Of Patents -0.00018*** -0.00018*** -0.00018*** -1.89e-05 
 (4.52e-05) (4.52e-05) (4.52e-05) (1.79e-05) 
Year and State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.02840*** -0.02840*** -0.02840*** -0.04530*** 
Observations 453,575 453,575 453,575 141,431 
Number of Inventors 116,557 116,557 116,557 64,514 
Note: Estimates based on the inventor-level analyses over a sample of inventor-year observations under the 
specification of a fixed-effect LPM. Sample in model 4 differs because of the different time period. Robust 






Table 7: Effect of openness on labor mobiity over time 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) 
Openness (Unweighted) 0.000436  
 (0.000996)  
Years 2006&2007 x Openness (Unweighted) -0.00165**  
 (0.000740)  
Years 2008&2009 x Openness (Unweighted) -0.00159**  
 (0.000802)  
Year 2010 x Openness (Unweighted) -0.00267***  
  (0.00101)  
Openness (Weighted)  0.00199*** 
  (0.000317) 
Years 2005 & 2006 x Openness (Weighted)  -0.00115*** 
  (0.000228) 
Years 2007 &2008 x Openness (Weighted)  -0.00159*** 
  (0.000252) 
Year 2010 &2009 x Openness (Weighted)  -0.00168*** 
  (0.000363) 
Basicness 3.38e-06 3.22e-06 
  (8.49e-06) (8.50e-06) 
Co-inventors -0.000891*** -0.000886*** 
  (0.000115) (0.000115) 
Cumulativeness -0.000788** -0.000825** 
  (0.000338) (0.000337) 
Involvement -0.00416*** -0.00424*** 
  (0.000337) (0.000329) 
Dominance -0.000500 -0.00128*** 
  (0.000373) (0.000394) 
Experience 0.00473*** 0.00466*** 
  (9.94e-05) (8.37e-05) 
Experience2 -5.71e-05*** -5.91e-05*** 
  (2.09e-06) (2.14e-06) 
No. Of Patents -1.28e-05** -1.31e-05*** 
 (5.00e-06) (5.01e-06) 
Year and State FE YES YES 
Constant -0.0311*** -0.0304*** 
 (0.000952) (0.000748) 
Observations 1,178,491 1,178,491 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 
Number of inventors 116,557 116,557 
Note: Estimates based on the inventor-level analyses over a sample of inventor-year observations under the 
specification of a fixed-effect LPM. Robust standard errors clustered at inventor-level are in brackets. ***1% 









Figure 3: The effects of inventor's knowledge (Weighted) openness over the years before 









Patent Enforcement Strength and Collaboration: 
The Effect of Firm’s Litigiousness on Alliances 
Intensity 
(co-authored with Eduardo Melero, David Wehrheim) 
3.1 INTODUCTION 
R&D collaborations play an important role in technological developments. They favor 
the creation of new technologies through the process of knowledge recombination, and spur 
the diffusion of existing ones (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). When considering the 
possibility of establishing a new collaboration with another organization, firms need to 
evaluate the tension between the added value that can be obtained from the project object of 
the alliance and the knowledge that can be absorbed as a consequence of working on it on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, the potential damage caused by knowledge leakage 
during the collaboration (Oxley, 1999; Katila, Rosenberg & Eisenhardt, 2008; Diestre & 
Rajagopalan, 2012).  
Past research has analyzed this trade-off, particularly for new entrepreneurial firms that 
have to make “swimming with the sharks” decisions (Katila et al., 2008). To a large extent, 
the literature on collaborations implicitly assigns an important enabling role to the 
enforceability of intellectual property (IP) rights in the balance of these decisions. In 
principle, a weak enforceability of those rights may keep innovators from sharing their 
knowledge in alliances, due to the fear of being expropriated by the partner, and thus may 





In this paper, however, we argue that a weaker enforcement of property rights 
generates two opposite forces on firms’ research collaborations. Consequently, it may 
increase or reduce collaborations depending on the intensity of each of these forces. As 
implicit in previous research on alliances, weaker enforcement increases the expected cost 
of any unintended knowledge leakage that may happen during the partnership, thus 
discouraging it. On the other hand, to the extent that the patent system operates as a block-
road to innovation by generating uncertainty and encouraging frivolous litigation (Lemley 
& Shapiro, 2005; Jaffe & Lerner, 2011; Mezzanotti, 2019), weaker enforcement increases 
the expected rewards to collaborative investments.  
Within this framework, we analyze the consequences of recent moves in the U.S. 
patent system toward weaker patent enforcement on the prevalence of alliances, which will 
depend on the importance of the two opposed forces outlined above. Due to the ambiguity 
of these forces' dominance over each other, we do not hypothesize the main effect. 
Nonetheless, we hypothesize that weaker patent enforcement tends to decrease the 
formation of alliances between partners of different sizes more than alliances between 
partners of similar size. These asymmetric alliances are typically characterized by involving 
a small partner that is particularly concerned about knowledge leakage to the counterpart 
(Katila et al., 2008). Alliances between partners of a similar size, on the other hand, are not 
expected to be discouraged, since they develop in a less unbalanced context. Secondly, we 
expect a relative increase in the prevalence of collaborations between relational partners, 
i.e., partners with a history of past collaboration together. Relational partners are likely to 
have developed mechanisms to avoid opportunistic appropriation of knowledge, and 
consequently experience less concerns of knowledge leakage (Deeds & Hill, 1999). 





through a reduced legal uncertainty regarding the outcome of the alliance. Finally, we also 
predict that the positive aspects of a weaker enforcement for R&D collaboration 
agreements will tend to be relatively more important than the negative ones for firms 
performing more basic-science research activities. The reason is that because basic-science-
related knowledge is idiosyncratically more difficult to absorb by potential partners (Lane 
& Lubatkin, 1998), weaker enforcement imposes fewer risks on collaborations for these 
companies.   
To test these hypotheses, we exploit the legal change in the treatment of patent 
infringement created by the U.S. Supreme Court decision “eBay v. MercExchange” in 
2006, which terminated the practice of automatically issuing an enduring injunction after 
proving a patent violation. There is a consensus among legal scholars that this decision 
effectively weakened the enforcement of patent protection (Tang, 2006; Bessen & Meurer, 
2008). We examine the impact of such a decision on firm’s decision to collaborate by 
exploiting heterogeneity among companies in their tendency to litigate as the treatment 
variable, and combining data from Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum for alliances, 
patent litigation data from Marco, Tesfayesus, & Toole (2017), patent data from Patentview 
dataset for co-patenting measures, data on the scientific references from Kevin A. Bryan, 
Yasin Ozcan, & Bhaven N. Sampat (2019), and control variables from Arora, Belenzon & 
Sheer (2019). Overall, our analysis suggests that the decrease in the patent protection 
enforcement leads companies in our sample to engage in fewer alliances. The results 
support our main predictions regarding the symmetric alliances in comparison to 
asymmetric alliances and the relational alliances in comparison to alliances with de novo 





3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
When organizations consider establishing an R&D collaboration partnership, they have 
to confront a fundamental dilemma. The collaboration may offer important added value 
within the defined scope of the collaboration (e.g., the development of some specific 
technology), and beyond it (e.g., through learning about new processes and technologies). 
At the same time, the collaboration also exposes the company to the risk of 
misappropriation by its partner through knowledge leakage (Oxley, 1999; Gans, Hsu & 
Stern, 2002). Both elements of this tension are inherent to the knowledge exchange process. 
The existence of IP rights that protect knowledge could, in principle, help to delimit the 
scope of knowledge exchange in R&D collaborations, and should be therefore an enabling 
factor for these collaborations. In practice, however, the patent system is characterized by 
its probabilistic nature (Lemely & Shapiro, 2005) and its costly and noisy enforcement 
system (Jaffe & Lerner, 2011). This may impose substantial frivolous-litigation costs on 
successful innovators and decrease firm’s incentives to invest in innovation (Mezzanotti, 
2019). 
Therefore, a decrease in the intensity of patent enforcement, such as the one that took 
place in the U.S. after 2006, does not have an unambiguous effect on the prevalence of 
inter-organizational collaborations. In principle, weaker property rights exacerbate the costs 
of knowledge leakage, as they increase the possibility of misappropriation by partners. On 
the other hand, weaker property rights decrease the expected costs associated with the 
implementation of knowledge acquired during the collaboration, either within or beyond 
the scope of the alliance (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). First, it decreases the litigation costs 





such acquired knowledge. More generally, weaker property rights may also decrease the 
expected legal costs that may be imposed by third parties in the case of a successful 
development of the acquired knowledge (Mezzanotti, 2019).  
From the previous theoretical analysis of the operating forces in the relationship 
between the IP protection and alliances ubiquity, we are not able to decide for an 
unequivocal effect. Thus, we basically consider the direction of the effect an empirical 
issue. Regardless of being agnostic regarding the balance of the two opposite forces 
affecting this relation, we propose next a series of hypotheses on the factors moderating 
such balance. 
3.2.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Collaborations 
Even if a universal unequivocal statement on the effect of weakening property rights 
on R&D collaborations cannot be established, there are particular types of collaborations 
that may be incentivized or discouraged by the process, because they are particularly 
sensitive to the different channels described above. This is the case of asymmetric 
collaborations involving partners of different sizes. The paradigm of collaboration between 
a small start-up and a well-established incumbent has been common in past research on 
alliances. Previous literature underlines that the problem of knowledge misappropriation by 
the partner is particularly acute for the smaller company in this context (Katila et al., 2008; 
Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). The bigger company is likely to have the necessary stock of 
complementary assets and financial slack to exploit that knowledge. The smaller company 
has few options of reacting against misappropriation other than through the legal system if 
there has been some property right infringement. On the contrary, when two similarly sized 





two reduces the overall misappropriation concerns in the alliance to intermediate levels. 
Additionally, the positive effect of less strong property rights, which takes the form of 
fewer barriers to the development of the outcome of the partnership, is expected to be 
similar for both types of collaborations. 
In consequence, a reduction in the strength of patent enforcement is expected to have a 
particularly detrimental effect on asymmetric collaborations between partners of different 
sizes, given the particularly acute concerns about knowledge misappropriation that take 
place in those types of collaborations.  
Hypothesis 1: The effect of a reduction in patent enforcement on the establishment of 
collaborations is expected to be less strongly positive (more strongly negative) for 
asymmetric collaborations between partners of different sizes than for symmetric 
collaborations between partners of a similar size. 
3.2.2 Relational Partners 
A second interesting margin in which the effect of patent enforcement on collaboration 
may differ is the stability of relationships with the partner. Literature on Transaction Cost 
Economics has long established that (implicit) relational contracts between parties that 
interact frequently is an effective way to solve opportunism problems. Long-term 
(relational) partners involved in these contracts typically establish clear internal norms 
concerning the terms of the collaboration. In the case of R&D alliances, these norms are 
expected to affect, at the very least, the most important dimensions of the collaboration, 
namely those related to the knowledge exchange (Deeds & Hill, 1999). With clear 
internally-enforced rules for the knowledge exchange, knowledge misappropriation 





whose exchange is regulated by some type of relational contracts, are barely affected by the 
negative consequences of weaker IP rights. On the other hand, they are fully affected by the 
positive side of weaker patent enforcement, through the reduced legal uncertainty regarding 
the outcome of the alliance. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of a reduction in patent enforcement on the establishment of 
collaborations is expected to be more strongly positive (less strongly negative) for 
long-term partners with a history than for de novo collaborators. 
3.2.3 Basic-Science-Related Research 
A third contextual factor that may affect the impact of patent enforcement on R&D 
collaborations is the nature of the knowledge produced at the organizations that are 
considering the possibility of forming an alliance. Research on absorptive capacity has 
established that firms typically have to make explicit efforts in acquiring a substantial 
scientific knowledge base in their technological fields in order to be able to absorb further 
basic knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). This also means that, on average, firms with a 
focus on basic-science research that are considering establishing an alliance are not 
particularly concerned with knowledge leakage. Since the type of knowledge that they hold 
is quite difficult to transfer, it is also quite unlikely to have it leaked involuntarily. 
Consequently, basic science-related knowledge tends to be less subject to misappropriation 
by partners. Thus, the negative impact of weaker patent enforcement for companies 
engaged in collaborations is less intense in the case of companies doing basic-science 
research. On the other hand, the expected benefits of weaker patent enforcement, in the 
form of decreased litigation-related uncertainty concerning the outcome of the alliance, are 





collaborations involving basic-research firms to be relatively favored by weaker patent 
enforcement. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of a reduction in patent enforcement on the establishment of 
collaborations is expected to be more strongly positive (less strongly negative) for 
companies that do basic-science-related research. 
3.3 THE “EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE” CASE 
In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled on the “eBay v. MercExchange” case, where the 
dispute between the companies was related to the infringement of one of MercExchange’s 
patents related to the fixed-price auction feature. This is the main event that allows us to 
examine the research issue. The 2006 Supreme Court’s decision put an end to the 
implementation of the rule of issuing an automatic and permanent injunction in case the 
patent found infringed and valid. Before that ruling, the infringed patent’s owner could 
almost always obtain injunctive relief where the infringing firm is forced to stop making, 
using or selling any item related to the violated knowledge, despite the essence and size of 
the violation. However, the court in 2006 introduced a four-part test to decide if the 
injunctive relief is a necessary remedy for the plaintiff. According to the Supreme Court, 
the granting of an almost mandatory injunction is contradicting the premises of the Patent 
Act, which instead demands the application of equitable principles in deciding on the 
compensation mechanism in a patent infringement case.28 
This significant ruling objective was mainly to limit abusive patent litigations and it 
achieved that by reducing the probability of obtaining an injunction for infringed patents 
and, therefore, remarkably reduced the patent enforcement strength in the U.S. (Ludlow, 
                                                      






2014). This ruling overturned the old presumption that the owner of a valid and infringed 
patent was granted the right of a permanent injunction, besides, the damage award which is 
a monetary compensation to the plaintiff for the caused damages. The presence of a strong 
litigation system with a near-mandatory injunction rule can lead to settlements that far 
exceed the costs that the potential infringer would pay in a negotiation before a case is 
filed, especially with minor infringements (Shapiro, 2010). In addition, the threat of 
injunction means that the firm can be forced to stop its operation before collecting returns 
from its investment in the specific technology that might be infringing. This large 
operational risk and the divergence of prices under pre- and post-infringement negotiation 
are factors in the hold-up problem originally described by Williamson (1979). 
Consequently, the bargaining position of the patent holders in the negotiations over patent 
disputes was strengthened due to the automatic injunction. In conclusion, eliminating 
automatic injunction is expected to decrease the hold-up costs of litigation, therefore 
amplifying the firms’ motives and financial ability to generally invest in R&D projects 
(Mezzanotti, 2019) as firms active in high-litigation fields are forced to allocate a higher 
proportion of their resources for defensive and protective activities (Cohen et al., 2014).  
Generally, the ruling in eBay v. MercExchange had an obvious effect on the use of 
injunction in court cases and patent enforcement more generally (e.g. Holte, 2015; Shapiro, 
2010). In details, the probability of succeeding in enforcing an injunction over the infringer 
after the supreme court decision decreased to 75% of the before ruling likelihood (Chien & 
Lemley, 2012). And this reduction was even stranger in the cases of the disputes between 





3.4 RESEARCH SETTING 
3.4.1 Empirical Setting 
The objective of our study is to analyze whether the change in the strength of the 
enforcement of patent rights (restriction of injunction cases) affects the prevalence of 
alliances. To examine this issue, we employ a quasi-natural experiment in which the patent 
enforcement strength in the U.S. was reduced by removing the automatic grant of 
permanent injunctions for proven patent infringement. The 2006 Supreme Court decision in 
“eBay v. MercExchange” case was a watershed where it stopped the practice of an 
automatically permanent injunction after proving a patent violation. By exploiting this shift 
in patent enforcement strength, we can explore the consequences on the firms’ R&D 
activities (Mezzanotti, 2019) and especially their collaboration activities in American 
market. Generally, all firms patenting in the U.S. have been influenced by this legal change, 
and therefore it is not straight-forward to decide on the control group in this study 
(Mezzanotti, 2019). 
We develop a research design that exploits a difference-in-difference approach around 
the main event, eBay v. MercExchange case. In order to exploit variation in firm’s 
litigiousness before and after 2006, we run a firm’s FE model to identify the firms that are 
more likely to be affected by the change in the strength of patent enforcement.  We study 
how the firm’s collaboration activities changes as a function of the firm’s litigiousness 
before and after the shock. In other words, we estimate: 
yjt = αj + αt + β (litigiousness j × After 2006) + γ Xjt + ɛjt 
where yjt is an outcome of firm j at time t measuring its collaboration activities, which 





activities that the firm files at the USPTO. After 2006 = 1{ time > decision}, (αj , αt) is a set 
of firm and time fixed effects, litigiousness j is the index of IP toughness by company j, 
measured prior to the shock, and Xjt is a matrix of controls. In an additional analysis, we 
add the knowledge basicness as moderator for the effect of litigiousness after 2006. 
3.4.2 Data 
The firms in our sample are the publicly traded U.S. firms with patenting history. The 
sample consists of about 2,800 firms over the period from 2000 to 2010, during which there 
were no major changes in the patent law except from the ruling on the “eBay v. 
MercExchange” case. Our panel consists of more than 20 thousand firm-year observations. 
We stopped the sampling by the end of 2010, because the America Invents Act, which 
introduced a significant change in the U.S. patent system, came into effect in 2011.  
We start with the sample of publicly traded firms from Compustat and then we limit 
the sample to the firms that have a positive stock patents in studied period. This constraint 
represents the intuitive that the non-patenting firms do not have the possibility to be part of 
a patent dispute. We match these firms with the SDC platinum alliance database to capture 
the collaborative activities of the firm. After that we match the sample with the patent data 
from Patentview29 dataset, which we used to create our co-patenting variables.  
As mentioned above, we use the patent litigation data from Marco, Tesfayesus, & 
Toole (2017), in order to in order to measure the intensity of litigiousness to the reform. For 
the variable basicness, we use the public data on the scientific references of patents from 
Bryan, Ozcan, & Sampat, (2019). To calculate our control variables, we utilize the work of 
                                                      





Arora, Belenzon & Sheer (2019), where the database links patent data to Compustat firms 
and we use their publicly available datasets.30 
3.4.3 Dependent Variables 
Collaboration measures. We use two sets of measures to reflect on the intensity of the 
firm’s collaboration activities. The first set utilize the R&D alliance projects the firm gets 
involved in. For this, we use the SDC Platinum alliances databases produced by Thomson 
Reuters31. The first measure indicates the probability of the firm to start at least one alliance 
project in each year. The second variable captures more variations in terms of the number 
of firm’s alliances. Alliances can have different forms such as; joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, research and development agreements, sales and marketing agreements, 
manufacturing agreements, supply agreements, and licensing and distribution pacts.   
Another categorization of alliances that we consider is the alliances asymmetry 
depending on the differences between the partners size and capabilities. We consider an 
alliance asymmetric if the partners are different in the size (total assets). Symmetry alliance 
happens when both companies have relatively similar size32. Moreover, we analyze two 
other types of alliances, the alliances with new partners and the relational alliances with 
partner whom firm has previous collaborative project with. 
The second set of measures for the firm’s collaborations is based on the co-patenting 
behavior. A co-patent is a co-owned patent that is registered with more than one assignee 
                                                      
30 Available at https://zenodo.org/record/3594694#.XpN9mMgzavu 
31 Thomson Financial Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances database defines the alliances as “Agreements 
where two or more entities have combined resources to form a new, mutually advantageous business 
arrangement to achieve predetermined objectives. All types of alliances are covered including: JVs, Strategic 
alliances, Licensing and exclusive licensing agreements, Research and development agreements, 
Manufacturing agreements, Marketing agreements, Supply agreements” (available at 
http://library.dialog.com/bluesheets/pdf/bl0554.pdf). 
32 We consider firms having similar size if the big firm is less than 10 times bigger than the smaller partner. 





where both owners can exploit the invention on their own behalf. Thus, co-patenting means 
a joint ownership of collaborative outcomes (Hagedoorn, 2003). Analogously, the first of 
these measures reflects on the probability of having at least one co-patent in a specific year. 
The second measure focuses on the intensity of the co-patenting activities and it is 
computed by aggregating the number of co-patents the firm files in a specific year. 
Additionally, we build a measure for the collaborations with a relational partner or a new 
partner. We track the co-patenting history of firm to determine if it has a previous co-patent 
with a specific co-patentee or it is the first co-patent they file together. Then, we aggregate 
the total number of new co-patentees and the total number of old co-patentees at the firm-
level for each year. 
3.4.4 Independent Variables 
Firm’s Litigiousness measures. In order to capture the firm’s litigiousness, we 
construct our measure based on the recent firm’s history of initiating patent infringement 
lawsuits. In details, our measure consists of the moving sum of the number of unique 
lawsuits filed by the firm in the last recent three years. We exclude the lawsuits filed 
against the firm because we are interested in apprehending a firm-specific proxy for taking 
litigious actions. This moving sum over the years from t-1 to t-3 is a time-varying measure 
that captures the intensity of the firm’s IP enforcement. This identification strategy has 
been used in literature to reflect on the firm’s reputation of toughness (Agarwal, Ganco, & 
Ziedonis 2009; Ganco, Ziedonis & Agarwal, 2015). To build this proxy, we use the data 
from Marco, Tesfayesus, & Toole (2017). This USPTO paper introduces the patent 
litigation data from U.S. district court electronic data where they collect the information 





involved, filing date, court location, litigated patents, and more information. We extract all 
the patent disputes that were asserted by the plaintiff and then use this information to 
measure the intensity of the firm’s litigiousness by computing the number of unique patent 
disputes in a specific year.  
Using this identification, we can analyze whether the weaker/stronger enforcement of 
patent rights (restriction of injunction rule) affects how the firm’s litigiousness impacts the 
prevalence of alliances. In conclusion, we identify the impact of the intensity of patent 
enforcement on the prevalence of alliances using a Differences in Differences approach 
where the intensity of the treatment is captured with tendency of the company to launch 
lawsuits of patent litigation.  
3.4.5 Moderator 
Knowledge basicness. We construct the knowledge basicness measure by building a 
proxy at the technological class level using the scientific references found in the in-text 
patent citations. We use the data provided by Kevin A. Bryan, Yasin Ozcan, & Bhaven N. 
Sampat, 2019. Instead of the front-page citation, they use the citations in the specification 
text itself. As the descriptive parts of patents are often mainly written by the inventors 
themselves, the authors argue that in-text citations should better measure the real 
knowledge inventors use to motivate and construct their inventions.  
For each firm, we take their patents in the year between 2000 and 2005 and we 
computed the average number of scientific references per patent the firm has used. After 
that, we construct a binary indicator that considers that the firm does basic research if the 
average of scientific references per patent is above the mean, and non-basic research 






We use the following variables as controls:  
Firm’s accumulated patents: This a variable that aggregate the patents that the firm 
has been granted up to a specific year t. As a control for the firm’s innovation output, which 
reflects on the technological capabilities of the firm (Bachmann, 1998). 
Return on assets: This is a control for the firm’s profitability and it is constructed by 
dividing the firm’s net income divided by the firm’s total assets.  
Growth Opportunities: we use the total assets proportional change with respect to the 
previous year total assets. This assets growth measure is associated with the firm’s value 
(Lang & Stulz, 1994).  
R&D intensity (R&D expenses adjusted by lagged total assets): This variable captures 
the investments that the firm makes in the innovation process weighted by the total assets 
from the previous year. Literature has argued for a positive relationship between internal 
R&D expenditures and external technology sourcing (Veugelers, 1997).  
Sales: We use this variable that capture the firm’s size and it absolute returns, which is 
a factor for the firm’s engagement in alliances projects (Cohen, Levin & Mowery, 1987). 
Employees: The firm’s human resources play a role in the firm’s ability to engaged in 
R&D alliances as the inventors of the firm work with the other firm’s inventors. Also, this 
variable captures the firm size.  
Cash: This variable controls for the firm financial liquidity.  
Firm Age: This variable control for the firm’s experience and it is measured as the 





Lerner Index: This index, formalized in 1934 by Abba Lerner, is a measure of a firm's 
market power. We calculate it based on the Lerner Index (see Lerner, 1934) by the 
difference between the output price of a firm and the marginal cost divided by the output 
price scaled by sales. 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects: In order to control for time invariant variations specific 
to each firm, besides, any time/year specific influences, we use firm’s and years fixed 
effects. 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The main idea of this research in broad terms is to investigate the effect of firm patent 
litigiousness on the probability of engaging in technological alliances. This paper 
empirically studies the effect of the ruling by estimating a difference-in-difference model 
that exploits a variation in firm’s litigiousness in 2006 to identify companies that are more 
likely to be affected by the eBay ruling in terms of their collaboration activities. Our sample 
consists of 17,227 firm-year observations. We start by providing some descriptive statics of 
the variables used in the analyses (See table (1)). table (2) illustrates the statistical 
correlations between these variables and the numbers do not suggest any harmless 
correlations.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
In figure 1, we present a preliminary picture of the firm’s tendency to get engaged in 
relation to its litigiousness. We do so by comparing the patterns in alliances between the 





calculate the average litigiousness of the firms in our sample and then we aggregate the 
number of alliances each year for the firms scoring above the mean litigiousness of our 
sample and for the firms scoring below the mean. The two series in the figure below 
suggest that the two types of firms having similar patterns in general. However, the gap is 
dramatically smaller in the last couple of years in our sample, 2009 and 2010. We notice 
the obvious decrease in the number of alliances in the years 2009 and 2010, which can be 
explained by the global and Eurozone recessions of 2009–2012 that followed the global 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Shijaku, Larraza‐Kintana & Urtasun‐Alonso, 2016). Next, 
we try to study these patterns through our models to statistically quantify these patterns. 
 
3.5.2 Main Results 
We perform multiple analyses to examine the predictions and propositions made in the 
theoretical part of our study. We start the analysis by studying the effect of litigiousness at 
the extensive margin of having any alliances project or a specific type of alliances. Table 
(3) represents the first set of analyses using an LPM where model 1 investigates the impact 
of the court ruling on the probability of having any alliances. By looking at the coefficient 
of the interaction term After 2006 × litigiousness, the firm’s litigiousness after the no 
injunction ruling in the eBay v. MercExchange case seems to have a significantly negative 
effect on the probability of the firm to start any alliances. More specifically, the coefficient 
implies that an extra lawsuit in the last three years will increase the chances of the firm to 
get engaged in on alliances at least by 0.4%33. These results indicate the dominance of the 
negative effect of a weaker IP enforcement on alliances resulting from the possibility that 
                                                      
33 Considering that litigiousness has a SD of 3.3.238, then one SD increase in the firm’s litigiousness is 





weaker IP rights intensify the costs of knowledge leakage and raise the chances of 
misappropriation by partners as opposed to the positive effect that may rise because of the 
litigation costs and risks reduction. This finding also suggests that the focal firm (supply 
side) cautious behavior after the IP protection reduction overweight the potential increased 
demand for alliances from the outsiders due to the expected costs and threats decrease. In 
short, this model connotes that, for our sample, the reduction of the IP enforcement due to 
the ruling in eBay v. MercExchange has reduced the effect of litigiousness on the firm’s 
number of alliances. 
In models 2 and 3, we run the same analysis for the probability of having at least one 
alliance of a specific type, namely an alliance with a partner with similar size (A Symmetric 
Alliance) and with a partner with a significantly different size (An Asymmetric Alliance). 
The interaction term in model 3 is statically in significant denoting that the IP shock had no 
effect on the probability of the firm to start a symmetric alliance. However, model 4 
demonstrate a significant negative association between the firm’s litigiousness and the 
firm’s asymmetric alliances. The difference between these two models support our second 
hypothesis stating that the effect of the reduction of IP protection is more strongly negative 
for asymmetric collaborations than for symmetric collaborations. 
In models 4 and 5, we study the second hypothesis regarding the difference in the 
effect between alliances with long-term partners with a history and alliances with de novo 
collaborators. Model 4 shows a significant and negative effect of the shock on the Alliances 
with New Partners Probability while model 5 shows insignificant effect on Alliances with 
Old Partners Probability. These analyses support the prediction made in our hypothesis 
that the alliances with relational (old) partner are less negatively affected by the reduction 





model 6 addresses the moderation effect of knowledge basicness. The coefficient of three-
way interaction term is statistically insignificant, which does not support our hypothesis 
about the difference of the effect on alliances for firms with basic knowledge. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
We run the same set of analyses in table 2 for the effect on the number of alliance 
projects that the firm starts in a specific year. Model 1 in this analysis does not support the 
dominance of any of the two forces discussed above. Models 2-5, does not provide 
additional support for our first and second hypotheses. Nonetheless, model 6 provides 
support the statement in the third hypothesis where we predicted the firm’s knowledge 
basicness to have positive moderation effect. The results reflect that the firms with basic 
knowledge is more strongly (positively) affected by the shock in terms of the number of 
alliance reduction. According to the three-way interaction term’s coefficient, the firms with 
basic knowledge is expected to experience an increase of their alliances by 0.03 alliances 
for each lawsuit they launch after 2006 in comparison to insignificant effect for firms with 
non-basic knowledge. In other words, one SD increase in the firm’s litigiousness is 
expected to have no impact on the firm’s alliances if the frim works mainly on a more 
applied knowledge, while a similar firm with a difference of working on basic knowledge is 
expected to launch one more alliance due to that increase of its litigiousness.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
For the second set of our measure for the firm collaborative activities, we perform a 
similar set of analyses for the effect on firm’s co-patenting activities (See Tables 5). The 
first two models, 1 and 2, represent the results for the effect on the extensive marginal of 





finding from table 3 about the average negative effect for our sample of firms. Numerically, 
one more lawsuit after 2006 is expected to decrease the firm’s co-patents by 0.026 in the 
next three years. The effect of the firm’s litigiousness after 2006 is significantly negative on 
the number of co-patents where one SD increase of the firm litigiousness after the ruling 
reduces the co-patents by 0.08. The comparison between the relational and de novo 
collaborators is displayed in the models 3-6 where we compare the probabilities as well as 
the absolute number of co-patents with these two different types of co-patentees. 
Analogously to our analysis in table 3 provides, at least partial, support for the first 
hypothesis. The last two models in table 5 represent the analysis of the moderation effect of 
the knowledge basicness on the litigiousness effect on the co-patenting activities. From 
model 7, we can conclude that, for firm’s with non-basic knowledge, the reduction in the 
co-patents is statistically insignificant, however, for firms with basic knowledge, the effect 
increased to a reduction by 0.022 co-patent. This model provide evidence to support our 
third hypothesis. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3.5.3 Additional analysis and Robustness Checks 
The case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange was argued March 29th, 2006 and decided on May 
15th, 2006. In our main analyses we consider the year 2006 as part of the after the shock 
period. However, as a robustness check we replicate all our analyses with excluding year 2006 
from the after the treatment period. The results are presented in Appendix A and they support 
our main findings from the main analyses which shows the robustness of our analysis for the 





Moreover, we investigate the effect of the firm’s litigiousness on the intensity of 
alliances over time. We compare the effect among the years in the sample by interacting the 
variable litigiousness with a dummy for each year. Table 6 presents the results of this 
analysis for our main variables for firm’s collaborative activities, namely alliances and co-
patenting. We examine the effect for our response variables at the extensive margin, models 
1 and 3, and at the absolute effect, models 2 and 4. As we argued that the reduction patent 
protection does not have a clear-cut direction of its effect, we notice that the firm’s 
toughness in enforcing its IP has generally positive effect on the firm’s alliances, especially 
before 2006, and this effect turns to be insignificant few years after stopping the automatic 
injunction rule in 2006 (See models 1 and 2). As for the firm’s co-patenting activities, we 
notice in model 3 that the firm’s litigiousness does not have a statistically significant effect 
on the probability on filing a co-patent. However, when we look at the effect on the number 
of co-patents in model 4, we see that the effect becomes significantly negative for all the 
years after the change in the IP protection after the ruling in on the “eBay v. 
MercExchange” case. We also provide a visualization of these coefficients in figure 2 for 
the four models. These analyses show that generally the reduction of the IP protection tends 
to decrease the collaborative activities of the firms in our sample and it may take a year or 
two for the effect to show up.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 and Figure 2 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
In order to examine the potential confounding effect of the financial crisis on 2007-
2008 on our result, we replicate the main analysis excluding the years after 2008. As 
mentioned earlier, the market experienced a general drop in the number of alliances after 





& Urtasun‐Alonso, 2016). The results presented in table 7 show that our baseline results 
only changed when considering the number of alliances as a response variable (See model 
2). These results do not sharply exclude the potential confounding effect of the financial 
crisis however, the results hold when considering co-patents as a measure for firms’ 
collaborative activities.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3.6 DISCUSSION CONCLUSIONS  
To examine the paper’s issue, we develop research settings that exploit a turning point 
in the corporate law recent history, the 2006 Supreme Court decision “eBay v. 
MercExchange.” The ruling ended the near mandatory practice of granting a permanent 
injunction after a patent proven valid and infringed. Given this large operational risk, the 
presence of automatic injunction gave patent holders a very strong bargaining position in IP 
disputes and negotiations and the ruling has reduced the probability of granting the 
injunction and, therefore, reduced the bargaining power of the plaintiff.  
In principle, this paper shows that changes in patent enforcement strength can have a 
significant impact on the incentives of firms to engage in R&D alliances. We argue that this 
is due to the consequent change in the balance between the learning opportunities and the 
litigation risks and costs. First argument that supports the negative effect prediction is that 
weaker enforcement increases the expected cost of any unintended knowledge leakage that 
may happen during the partnership, thus discouraging collaborations. The other argument at 
play is that, with strongly-enforced patent protection, the value of using a technology 
through an alliance with the counterpart increases vis a vis the value of doing it alone (and 





enforcement increases the relative attractiveness of alliances. Our results imply that the 
leakage-risk mechanism dominates, on average, the learning opportunities mechanism, at 
least for our sample of firms. In other words, weaker property rights (default injunction) 
leads on average to less collaborations and alliances.  
Our study contributes to the management literature studying the relationship between 
legal aspects of the IP rights enforcement and economic activity represented by the 
alliances and collaboration activities. Moreover, by analyzing the two parties in an alliance 
in a specific legal system and the litigiousness of the partners, we contribute to the alliances 
literature through taking into account the expected return from the knowledge learning 






3.7 Chapter 3 Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Yearly number of alliances 0.109 0.602 0 32 
Alliance Probability 0.047 0.212 0 1 
Symmetric Alliances 0.013 0.116 0 3 
Symmetric Alliance Probability 0.012 0.11 0 1 
Asymmetric Alliance Probability 0.017 0.131 0 1 
Asymmetric Alliances 0.020 0.170 0 6 
Alliances with New Partners 0.102 0.508 0 18 
Alliances with New Partners Probability 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Alliances with Old Partners 0.007 0.176 0 14 
Alliances with Old Partners Probability 0.004 0.063 0 1 
Litigiousness 0.678 3.238 0 126 
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) 2.209 2.148 0 10.116 
ROA -1.019 48.988 -6309 1827 
Growth Opportunities 1.281 73.666 -0.999 6785 
R&D adjusted by Lagged TA (log(x+1)) 0.128 0.216 -0.853 5.656 
Sales (log(x+1)) 4.753 2.608 -2.017 12.96 
Employees (log(x+1)) 0.928 1.146 0 6.059 
Cash (log(x+1)) 3.219 2.649 -6.908 11.321 
Firm age (log(x+1)) 2.834 0.663 0.693 4.127 
Lerner Index -9.873 273.839 -2.93E+04 358.211 
Note: These observations for the full sample of 17,227 firm-year observations.
Table 2: Correlation matrix among of the main variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Yearly number of alliances 1                    
Alliance Probability 0.531 1                   
Symmetric Alliances 0.344 0.353 1                  
Symmetric Alliance Probability 0.34 0.355 0.98 1                 
Asymmetric Alliance Probability 0.395 0.455 0.081 0.083 1                
Asymmetric Alliances 0.484 0.425 0.093 0.096 0.901 1               
Alliances with New Partners 0.964 0.586 0.354 0.353 0.414 0.493 1              
Alliances with New Partners Probability 0.659 0.75 0.374 0.381 0.45 0.409 0.743 1             
Alliances with Old Partners 0.641 0.127 0.156 0.146 0.157 0.232 0.415 0.114 1            
Alliances with Old Partners Probability 0.445 0.179 0.172 0.155 0.185 0.206 0.319 0.162 0.602 1           
Litigiousness 0.273 0.153 0.046 0.045 0.243 0.146 0.202 0.138 0.045 0.092 1          
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) 0.135 0.104 0.065 0.065 0.08 0.083 0.145 0.138 0.045 0.094 0.258 1         
ROA 0.002 0 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.009 1        
Growth Opportunities -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.019 0 1       
R&D adjusted by lagged TA (log(x+1)) 0.022 0.053 0.021 0.023 0.04 0.031 0.025 0.051 0.001 0.009 -0.035 -0.071 -0.09 0.116 1      
Sales (log(x+1)) 0.083 0.029 0.03 0.027 0.022 0.033 0.087 0.054 0.032 0.06 0.211 0.551 0.031 -0.021 -0.413 1     
Employees (log(x+1)) 0.122 0.048 0.037 0.033 0.038 0.05 0.127 0.084 0.052 0.093 0.241 0.592 0.016 -0.012 -0.287 0.86 1    
Cash (log(x+1)) 0.119 0.096 0.059 0.056 0.077 0.079 0.129 0.125 0.035 0.076 0.204 0.573 0.051 -0.02 -0.159 0.69 0.602 1   
Firm age (log(x+1)) 0.025 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.01 0.002 0.024 -0.013 0.016 0.034 0.113 0.238 0.005 -0.005 -0.271 0.427 0.464 0.145 1  
Lerner Index 0.001 0 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.004 -0.001 -0.075 0.069 0.026 0.005 0.028 1 






Table 3: LPM models’ main results for the effect of litigiousness on the probability of having 
at least one (specific type of) alliance and the moderation effect of knowledge basicness.  



















       
Litigiousness 0.006*** -0.001 0.003* 0.004*** 0.001** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
After 2006 × Litigiousness -0.004*** 0.000 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge 
× After 2006 × Litigiousness 
     0.008 
      (0.008) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge 
× Litigiousness 
     0.002 
      (0.004) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge 
× After 2006 
     0.026 
      (0.028) 
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) -0.002 0.003 -0.004* -0.010** -0.001* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Growth Opportunities 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D adjusted by Lagged 
TA (log(x+1)) 
0.017 0.003 0.007 -0.006 0.004 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.005) (0.018) 
Sales (log(x+1)) 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Employees (log(x+1)) -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.004) (0.014) 
Cash (log(x+1)) -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Firm age (log(x+1)) 0.002 -0.014 -0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.024) (0.007) (0.021) 
Lerner Index -0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.044 0.053 0.033 0.088 0.003 0.033 
 (0.055) (0.033) (0.040) (0.065) (0.019) (0.058) 
Observations 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 15,033 
Number of firms 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,121 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect LPM. 







Table 4: Poisson models’ main results for the effect of litigiousness on the number of 
(specific type of) alliance and the moderation of knowledge basicness. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
Litigiousness 0.011*** -0.009 0.012*** 0.005 0.016 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.021) (0.003) 
After 2006 × Litigiousness 0.001 0.005 -0.018 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.036) (0.012) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × After 
2006 × Litigiousness 
     0.030*** 
      (0.009) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × 
Litigiousness 
     0.012 
      (0.010) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × After 
2006 
     0.288 
      (0.212) 
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) -0.101 0.417** -0.293* -0.095 -0.554 -0.076 
 (0.123) (0.180) (0.177) (0.149) (0.361) (0.134) 
ROA 0.001 0.325 -0.068 0.003 0.629 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.318) (0.050) (0.004) (0.453) (0.003) 
Growth Opportunities -0.003 -0.019 0.030 -0.050 -0.293 -0.008 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.050) (0.032) (0.279) (0.026) 
R&D adjusted by Lagged TA (log(x+1)) 0.163 0.117 -0.019 0.082 -0.021 0.166 
 (0.313) (0.706) (0.447) (0.334) (1.631) (0.330) 
Sales (log(x+1)) -0.047 -0.057 -0.064 -0.011 -0.250 -0.039 
 (0.090) (0.171) (0.137) (0.084) (0.368) (0.092) 
Employees (log(x+1)) 0.111 -0.002 0.098 0.111 1.617** -0.058 
 (0.322) (0.419) (0.453) (0.242) (0.704) (0.365) 
Cash (log(x+1)) 0.012 -0.111 -0.004 0.017 -0.155 0.051 
 (0.050) (0.093) (0.091) (0.046) (0.202) (0.054) 
Firm age (log(x+1)) -0.213 -0.936 0.200 -0.769** -0.559 -0.140 
 (0.351) (0.954) (0.703) (0.384) (1.766) (0.330) 
Lerner Index -
0.000*** 
0.003 0.003** -0.000 0.002 -
0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 3,806 1,415 1,722 4,759 369 3,481 
Number of firms 446 158 201 555 40 405 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect Poisson 








Table 5: The results of the effect of litigiousness on firm’s co-patenting activities. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Probability 


























         
Litigiousness -0.000 -0.008*** 0.002** 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
After 2006 × 
Litigiousness 
-0.001 -0.026*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.018** -0.010 -0.001 -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) 
Firm with Basic 
Knowledge × 
After 2006 × 
Litigiousness 
      0.022** 0.018 
       (0.009) (0.022) 
Firm with Basic 
Knowledge × 
Litigiousness 
      0.002 -0.033** 
       (0.005) (0.014) 
Firm with Basic 
Knowledge × 
After 2006 
      -0.032 -0.056 
       (0.020) (0.282) 
Patent Stock 
(log(x+1)) 
0.001 -0.669*** 0.000 -0.001 0.061 -0.218 0.001 -0.688*** 
 (0.002) (0.115) (0.001) (0.001) (0.313) (0.338) (0.002) (0.119) 
ROA -0.000 -0.464* -0.000 -0.000 -0.967* 0.030 -0.000 -0.436* 
 (0.000) (0.242) (0.000) (0.000) (0.522) (0.580) (0.000) (0.243) 
Growth 
Opportunities 
-0.000 0.057 -0.000 -0.000 -0.232 -0.061 -0.000** 0.053 
 (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.256) (0.120) (0.000) (0.090) 
R&D adjusted by 
lagged TA 
(log(x+1)) 
-0.006 -2.711*** -0.000 -0.005 0.377 -2.657* -0.007 -2.591*** 
 (0.006) (0.870) (0.004) (0.004) (1.390) (1.466) (0.006) (0.875) 
Sales (log(x+1)) 0.006** 1.163*** 0.004** 0.004 1.095*** 0.554* 0.006** 1.173*** 
 (0.003) (0.146) (0.001) (0.002) (0.328) (0.322) (0.002) (0.150) 
Employees 
(log(x+1)) 
0.012 -0.433** 0.009 0.002 -0.363 0.259 0.013 -0.409* 
 (0.009) (0.214) (0.006) (0.007) (0.552) (0.521) (0.009) (0.216) 
Cash (log(x+1)) -0.000 0.397*** -0.000 0.001 0.260* 0.180 0.000 0.391*** 
 (0.001) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001) (0.141) (0.201) (0.001) (0.058) 
Firm age 
(log(x+1)) 
-0.002 -0.192 0.004 0.013 -0.603 -0.004 -0.008 -0.241 
 (0.014) (0.470) (0.013) (0.011) (1.355) (1.311) (0.016) (0.478) 
Lerner Index -0.000 -0.023 -0.000 -0.000 -0.015 0.056 -0.000 -0.023 
 (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.046) (0.000) (0.024) 
Constant -0.011  -0.022 -0.039   0.004  
 (0.041)  (0.034) (0.033)   (0.043)  
Observations 17,227 1,540 17,227 17,227 1,214 782 15,033 1,520 
Number of firms 2,566 162 2,566 2,566 125 83 2,121 159 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect models. 
We use LPM in models 1, 3, 4, and 7. Poisson models are employed in the other models. Robust standard errors 






Table 6: The effect of firm’s litigiousness over the years in the sample. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Alliance 
Probability 
Alliances Probability of 




     
Litigiousness × Year 2000 0.008 -0.012 0.003 -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.039) (0.004) (0.015) 
Litigiousness × Year 2001 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.030) (0.003) (0.009) 
Litigiousness × Year 2002 0.009*** 0.011 0.002 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) 
Litigiousness × Year 2003 0.006*** 0.009 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005) 
Litigiousness × Year 2004 0.007*** 0.016** -0.000 -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
Litigiousness × Year 2005 0.007*** 0.011** -0.002 -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Litigiousness × Year 2006 0.006*** 0.001 0.001 -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
Litigiousness × Year 2007 0.011*** 0.013 0.002 -0.050*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) 
Litigiousness × Year 2008 0.009*** 0.005 -0.005 -0.080*** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.013) 
Litigiousness × Year 2009 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.008) 
Litigiousness × Year 2010 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.005) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.049  0.001  
 (0.054)  (0.041)  
Observations 17,227 3,806 17,227 1,540 
Number of Firms 2,566 446 2,566 162 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect models. 
We use LPM in models 1 and 3. Poisson models are employed in the other models. In these models, we include 
all the control variables used in the main analyses. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are in brackets. 








Table 7: The potential confounding effect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis of the IP protection 
strength relationship with collaborations prevalence.  









     
Litigiousness 0.006*** 0.009*** -0.001 -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
After 2006 × Litigiousness 0.003* 0.002 -0.002 -0.051*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) 
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) 0.001 -0.094 0.001 -0.921*** 
 (0.004) (0.127) (0.002) (0.149) 
ROA -0.000 -0.026** -0.000 -0.547** 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.258) 
Growth 0.000 -0.009 -0.000 -0.111 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.144) 
R&D adjusted by Lagged TA (log(x+1)) 0.014 0.282 -0.007 -1.877* 
 (0.020) (0.388) (0.006) (1.090) 
Sales (log(x+1)) 0.002 -0.072 0.005** 1.853*** 
 (0.006) (0.095) (0.002) (0.183) 
Employees (log(x+1)) -0.002 0.188 0.013 -1.292*** 
 (0.018) (0.339) (0.009) (0.271) 
Cash (log(x+1)) -0.000 0.031 -0.001 0.399*** 
 (0.002) (0.053) (0.001) (0.068) 
Firm age (log(x+1)) 0.001 -0.317 -0.019 -0.305 
 (0.027) (0.377) (0.018) (0.572) 
Lerner Index -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.015 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
Constant 0.032  0.040  
 (0.074)  (0.049)  
Observations 14,377 3,066 14,377 1,174 
Number of firms 2,442 420 2,442 144 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect models. 
We use LPM in models 1 and 3. Poisson models are employed in the other models. Robust standard errors 





3.8 Chapter 3 Figures 
Figure 1: The pattern of the number of alliances of firms with high and low litigiousness. 
 





3.9 Chapter 3 Appendix A 
Table A.1: Main results of FE LPM models for the effect of litigiousness on the probability of 
having at least one (specific type of) alliance and the moderation of knowledge basicness. 



















       
Litigiousness 0.007*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
After 2005 × Litigiousness -0.003*** 0.001 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.001* -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × 
After 2005 × Litigiousness 
     0.007* 
      (0.004) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × 
Litigiousness 
     0.000 
      (0.005) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × 
After 2005 
     0.012 
      (0.024) 
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.010** -0.001* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Growth Opportunities 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D adjusted by Lagged TA 
(log(x+1)) 
0.017 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.004 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.005) (0.018) 
Sales (log(x+1)) 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Employees (log(x+1)) -0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.004) (0.014) 
Cash (log(x+1)) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Firm age (log(x+1)) 0.002 -0.014 -0.006 0.007 0.002 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) (0.007) (0.021) 
Lerner Index -0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.044 0.051* 0.042 0.088 0.006 0.036 
 (0.055) (0.030) (0.038) (0.065) (0.020) (0.059) 
Observations 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 17,227 15,033 
R-squared 0.012 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.013 
Number of firms 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,566 2,121 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect LPM. 







Table A.2: Main results of FE Poisson models for the effect of litigiousness on the number of 
(specific type of) alliance and the moderation of knowledge basicness. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











       
Litigiousness 0.012*** -0.013 0.015*** 0.006 0.019 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) 
After 2005 × Litigiousness -0.006** 0.013 -0.022*** -0.002 -0.012 -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.007) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × After 
2005 × Litigiousness 
     0.045*** 
      (0.008) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × 
Litigiousness 
     -0.013 
      (0.014) 
Firm with Basic Knowledge × After 
2005 
     0.217 
      (0.180) 
Patent Stock (log(x+1)) -0.096 0.411** -0.291 -0.092 -0.540 -0.075 
 (0.123) (0.179) (0.177) (0.148) (0.362) (0.133) 
ROA 0.001 0.326 -0.066 0.003 0.619 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.318) (0.048) (0.004) (0.451) (0.003) 
Growth Opportunities -0.004 -0.018 0.029 -0.050 -0.291 -0.009 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.051) (0.032) (0.277) (0.027) 
R&D adjusted by Lagged TA 
(log(x+1)) 
0.151 0.127 -0.027 0.074 -0.026 0.155 
 (0.315) (0.705) (0.448) (0.335) (1.629) (0.333) 
Sales (log(x+1)) -0.050 -0.058 -0.070 -0.013 -0.262 -0.045 
 (0.091) (0.171) (0.138) (0.084) (0.373) (0.094) 
Employees (log(x+1)) 0.086 0.003 0.064 0.101 1.607** -0.089 
 (0.321) (0.420) (0.461) (0.242) (0.707) (0.364) 
Cash (log(x+1)) 0.016 -0.109 -0.002 0.018 -0.156 0.056 
 (0.050) (0.093) (0.091) (0.046) (0.205) (0.055) 
Firm age (log(x+1)) -0.348 -0.828 0.027 -0.849** -0.657 -0.276 
 (0.363) (0.883) (0.704) (0.381) (1.734) (0.343) 
Lerner Index -0.000*** 0.003 0.003** -0.000 0.002 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 3,806 1,415 1,722 4,759 369 3,481 
Number of firms 446 158 201 555 40 405 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect Poisson 







Table A.3: Results of the effect of litigiousness on firm’s co-patenting activities. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Probability 











with an old 
collaborator 
Number of co-





with an old 
collaborator 
Probability 





         
Litigiousness -0.001 -0.005** 0.002* 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
After 2005 × 
Litigiousness 
0.000 -0.019*** -0.002** 0.000 -0.012 -0.008* -0.000 -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
Firm with Basic 
Knowledge × 
After 2005 × 
Litigiousness 
      0.024*** 0.039 
       (0.003) (0.024) 
Firm with Basic 
Knowledge × 
Litigiousness 
      -0.009 -0.057** 
       (0.007) (0.024) 
Firm with Basic 
Knowledge × 
After 2005 
      -0.024 -0.092 
       (0.017) (0.276) 
Patent Stock 
(log(x+1)) 
0.000 -0.673*** 0.000 -0.001 0.055 -0.216 0.001 -0.696*** 
 (0.002) (0.115) (0.001) (0.001) (0.312) (0.337) (0.002) (0.119) 
ROA -0.000 -0.440* -0.000 -0.000 -0.961* 0.049 -0.000 -0.425* 
 (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.000) (0.518) (0.585) (0.000) (0.242) 
Growth 
Opportunities 
-0.000 0.032 -0.000 -0.000 -0.246 -0.070 -0.000* 0.033 
 (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.254) (0.127) (0.000) (0.094) 
R&D adjusted by 
Lagged TA 
(log(x+1)) 
-0.006 -2.558*** -0.000 -0.005 0.450 -2.658* -0.006 -2.548*** 
 (0.006) (0.873) (0.004) (0.004) (1.393) (1.516) (0.006) (0.879) 
Sales (log(x+1)) 0.006** 1.125*** 0.004** 0.004 1.082*** 0.538 0.006** 1.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.144) (0.001) (0.002) (0.322) (0.328) (0.003) (0.147) 
Employees 
(log(x+1)) 
0.011 -0.411* 0.009 0.002 -0.370 0.262 0.013 -0.378* 
 (0.009) (0.214) (0.006) (0.007) (0.554) (0.537) (0.009) (0.215) 
Cash (log(x+1)) -0.000 0.397*** -0.000 0.001 0.256* 0.186 -0.000 0.389*** 
 (0.001) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001) (0.142) (0.201) (0.001) (0.058) 
Firm age 
(log(x+1)) 
0.001 -0.122 0.006 0.012 -0.559 0.022 -0.005 -0.174 
 (0.015) (0.470) (0.012) (0.011) (1.331) (1.291) (0.016) (0.477) 
Lerner Index -0.000 -0.021 -0.000 -0.000 -0.015 0.059 -0.000 -0.020 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.047) (0.000) (0.020) 
Constant -0.018  -0.028 -0.038   -0.005  
 (0.041)  (0.033) (0.032)   (0.043)  
Observations 17,227 1,540 17,227 17,227 1,214 782 15,033 1,520 
Number of firms 2,566 162 2,566 2,566 125 83 2,121 159 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Estimates based on the firm-level analyses over 10 years under the specifications of a fixed-effect Poisson 
models. We use LPM in models 1, 3, 4, and 7. Poisson models are employed in the other models. Robust 
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